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ARTICLES
UNSTITCHING SCARLET LETTERS?:
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND
EXPUNGEMENT
Brian M. Murray*
Criminal record history information pejoratively brands those who contact
the criminal justice system, whether they were guilty or not. In theory, the
remedy of expungement is designed to mitigate the unanticipated, negative
effects of a criminal record. But the reality is that prosecutors—driven by a
set of incentives that are fundamentally antithetical to expungement—control
many of the levers that determine expungement eligibility. The disjunction
between the prosecutorial mindset and the “minister of justice” ideal could
not be starker, nor its consequences more significant. Prosecutors, as agents
of the state, can advocate forcefully for either the retention or deletion of
such information, which, given the pervasive web of collateral consequences
associated with a criminal record, can have a dramatic effect on the situation
of an arrestee or ex-offender. This discretion, as it relates to theories of
punishment, prosecutorial discretion overall, the ethical responsibilities of
prosecutors to do justice, and public policy interests, has been grossly
underanalyzed despite the serious implications it has for both the
prosecutorial role within the criminal justice system and for reentry efforts.
While many scholars have paid attention to how prosecutorial incentives
conflict with the theoretical responsibilities of prosecutors in charging, plea
bargaining, and postconviction situations involving innocence, none have
provided a theoretical framework focused on the role of the prosecutor
during expungement. Many of the complicated incentives that undermine
holistic prosecution during those earlier phases exist during the
expungement process as well. But scholarly responses to those incentives
are not adequate given the range of considerations during the expungement
phase. As such, this Article argues that scholarly discussions about
prosecutorial discretion need to extend their focus beyond the exercise of
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prosecutorial judgment pretrial or questions of factual and legal guilt. Given
that the primary role of the prosecutor is to do “justice,” this Article calls
for increased attention to the exercise of discretion after the guilt phase is
complete, specifically in the context of expungement of nonconviction and
conviction information. It offers a framework for exercising such discretion
and, in doing so, hopes to initiate additional conversation about the role of
prosecutors during the phases that follow arrest and prosecution.
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INTRODUCTION
When should a prosecutor support or oppose the unstitching of a scarlet
letter?1 Consider the case of Frank Jackson, a man in his seventies who
applied for a customer service, telemarketing position with a large, regional
insurance company.2 Unable to obtain and maintain steady employment for
1. See generally NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (1850).
2. The following account is a fictional scenario based on the author’s experience as a
practicing attorney in both the criminal defense and employment law contexts. The plight of
the ex-offender is all too common. See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Out of Trouble, but
Criminal Records Keep Men out of Work, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/01/business/out-of-trouble-but-criminal-records-keepmen-out-of-work.html [https://perma.cc/CM66-UGZE] (noting that men with criminal
backgrounds account for about 34 percent of nonworking men ages twenty-five to fifty-four
in the United States and discussing challenges they face to employment); City Employee
Credits Alumnus with Ending 20-Year Nightmare, DREXEL U. THOMAS R. KLINE SCH. L. (July
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years, and unemployed for the previous nine months, Mr. Jackson applied,
interviewed exceptionally well, and was told he would hear from the
company about a start date in a week.
A few days later, the background check report sent to his employer arrived
in his mailbox. It came with a letter from the company, which cited Mr.
Jackson’s nearly fifty-year-old, low-level misdemeanor assault conviction as
the reason for not moving forward with his application. Mr. Jackson’s
conviction resulted when, as a teenager, he pushed someone during a protest
of the Vietnam War; he served no jail time and his punishment was a fine.
When he called the company to explain the conviction, the company’s
representative was sympathetic but cited company policy against hiring
individuals convicted of violent crimes, no matter how old and regardless of
the fact that the position involved no physical interaction with customers.
That was exactly what the last potential employer had told him, and the one
before that, and the one before that.
This time, Mr. Jackson sought legal assistance. The attorney he met with
explained that the insurance company may have violated civil rights laws3
with its decision not to hire him and that the clinic could advocate on his
behalf with the potential employer, but it probably could not bring suit due
to the clinic’s limited resources. Although federal and state law, in theory,
protected individuals like Mr. Jackson, the statutes were untested and viewed
skeptically by the judiciary. Besides, a lengthy litigation would do nothing
for him in the short term. But all hope was not lost; it turned out that Mr.
Jackson’s conviction was eligible for expungement. Rejuvenated, he had the
attorney file a petition for expungement on his behalf.
Unfortunately for Mr. Jackson, despite years of personal rehabilitation, it
took years before he received the expungement, which stalled his job
prospects. His petition was denied multiple times, largely due to the actions
of an individual prosecutor in the jurisdiction. First, the prosecutor balked
at, and rejected, the petitioner’s filing—something the statute allowed him to
do—causing Mr. Jackson’s attorney to seek judicial recourse simply to file.
Second, the prosecutor objected to the petition, thereby requiring a hearing
on the merits, which took three months to schedule. When the date finally
came, the prosecutor objected to the merits of the petition at the hearing on
the ground that the state, and particularly the prosecutor’s office, needed to
maintain records of past convictions for future law enforcement purposes.
Even though the statute would allow the prosecutor’s office to retain the
record even if it was sealed from the public and background-check
companies, and despite Mr. Jackson’s otherwise clean record in the nearly

22, 2014), http://drexel.edu/law/about/news/articles/overview/2014/July/epps-expungementproject/ [https://perma.cc/U9T5-X8X5] (describing the story of an African American female
veteran with a mutual combat conviction stemming from self-defense that prevented her from
developing any type of career for twenty years).
3. See, e.g., Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMP. COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest_conviction.cfm [https://perma.cc/989G-9H9L]
(last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
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fifty years since his arrest, the judge denied Mr. Jackson’s petition for
expungement. It took another year, after an appeal, for Mr. Jackson to
achieve the expungement necessary to obtain employment. In the meantime,
Mr. Jackson struggled to secure a job, shelter, and other basic life necessities.
Mr. Jackson’s story is far too common for Americans with nonconviction
and low-level conviction criminal record history information, especially
younger Americans with criminal records. In an age where the number of
misdemeanor arrests and convictions is astounding and where employers and
other institutions rely on such information to screen applicants, expungement
can hasten positive reentry and the societal benefits such reentry reaps.4
Interestingly, how prosecutors may and should react to expungement,
especially when afforded significant discretion to either construct or remove
hurdles for those pursuing it, has never been analyzed in depth. The
complicated incentives that drive prosecutors to act as staunch advocates with
a conviction-first and conviction-preserved-at-all-costs mentality create a
disjunction between the ideals of holistic prosecution and the reality of
postconviction prosecutorial decision-making.
Beyond conflicting
incentives, prosecutors have also been left without guidance on expungement
proceedings—processes that have significant consequences for defendants
and implicate the civil policy objectives of the state.
Expungement,5 a remedy afforded in most state jurisdictions as a matter of
constitutional or statutory law, furthers not only rehabilitation and reentry but
restoration—for both the defendant and the community. The broadening of
expungement remedies provides ex-offenders hope. While expungement is
a constantly developing remedy in the information age, with much legislative
progress still to occur and hopefully on the horizon,6 some individuals are
4. See generally Megan Denver et al., A New Look at the Employment and Recidivism
Relationship through the Lens of a Criminal Background Check, 55 CRIMINOLOGY 174 (2017)
(noting how prospective employees who receive a clear background check are less likely to
be subsequently arrested). For additional real-world examples, see, e.g., Raymond Owens,
Berkeley Deputy Starts ‘Expungement Team’ to Help People Find a Job, NEWS2 (Jan. 11,
2017), http://counton2.com/2017/01/11/berkeley-deputy-starts-expungement-team-to-helppeople-find-a-job/ [https://perma.cc/4SAN-GEN8]. Deputy Edmund Vice stated:
We’ve seen several people who are trying to find jobs that cannot find jobs . . . . I
had a gentleman come and tell me he had started as a business hauling materials.
He had started a business hauling wood chips or something like that. He came here
in a panic one day because that [an old conviction] was stopping him from getting a
contract.
Id.
5. For purposes of this Article, expungement means the “erasure or elimination of
criminal record history information by rendering the information inaccessible, either because
it has been destroyed or sealed from the view of certain individuals.” Brian M. Murray, A
New Era for Expungement Law Reform? Recent Developments at the State and Federal Level,
10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 362 (2016). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “expungement
of record” as “the removal of a conviction (esp. for a first offense) from a person’s criminal
record.” Expungement of record, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
6. See Second Chance Reforms in 2017: Roundup of New Expungement and Restoration
Laws, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR. (2017), http://ccresourcecenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/Second-Chance-Reforms-in-2017-CCRC-Dec-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X8JH-7K9M]; see also Murray, supra note 5, at 362; Jenny Roberts,
Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 321, 322; Recent
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only a hearing away from restoration in the wake of suspicion (in the case of
arrest) or retribution (in the case of conviction).7 This is especially true in
the case of order-maintenance offenses or the prosecution of petty crimes.8
Prosecuted at an alarming rate and arguably without normative justification,
these are the types of contacts with the system that are not published widely,
but are frequently reported by background check companies.9 That
And an
widespread reporting operates as unending punishment.10
examination of a significant number of state processes, undertaken for this
Article, reveals that the prosecutor plays a significant procedural or
substantive role in mitigating a criminal record’s effect in many jurisdictions
across the country.11
As such, expungement relates directly to the prosecutorial responsibility
to pursue fair and just punishment on behalf of the community. When a
criminal record—based on arrest or conviction—has the dramatic effect that
it does today, ignoring the ability of prosecutors to soften its effect, or even
erase its existence, lets prosecutors off the hook, shortchanges defendants,
and ignores the deleterious effects on reentry efforts and the system as a
whole.12 Prosecutors in all jurisdictions face countless dispositions that
allow for expungement, a remedy that inherently accounts for the symbiotic
relationship between justice and mercy, the latter of which has not been
adequately accounted for in studies of prosecutorial discretion after a

Case, Doe v. United States, No. 14-MC-1412, 2015 WL 2452613 (E.D.N.Y. May 21, 2015),
129 HARV. L. REV. 582 (2015). A petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court
for Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448 (E.D.N.Y 2015), was recently denied. Doe v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (2017). By the time it reached the Supreme Court, however,
the case had mostly turned into a question of the reach of ancillary jurisdiction in Article III
federal district courts. See Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192, 194 (2d Cir. 2016). While the
jurisdictional issue at the federal level is beyond the scope of this Article, the petition for
certiorari suggests that the federal law of expungement may soon see changes.
7. Of course, expungement is not a panacea; expungement as a remedy is limited—
especially in the information age—and is only one aspect of the effort to further reentry. But
in an age where what is attached to one’s name has incredible repercussions for associations
within communities and societies at large, expungement remains a crucial part of the larger
puzzle.
8. See Andrew Ingram, Breaking Laws to Fix Broken Windows: A Revisionist Take on
Order Maintenance Policing, 19 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 112, 113 (2014).
9. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not
to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1656–58 (2010) [hereinafter Bowers, Legal Guilt];
Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319,
319–20 (2012); Shawn Bushway et al., Private Providers of Criminal History Records: Do
You Get What You Pay for?, in BARRIERS TO REENTRY?: THE LABOR MARKET FOR RELEASED
PRISONERS IN POST-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 174, 174 (Shawn Bushway et al. eds., 2007);
Michelle Natividad Rodriguez & Maurice Emsellem, 65 Million “Need Not Apply”: The Case
for Reforming Criminal Background Checks for Employment, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (2011),
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/65_Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZA94-694L].
10. Alessandro Corda, More Justice and Less Harm: Reinventing Access to Criminal
History Records, 60 HOW. L.J. 1, 26–40 (2016) (detailing the stigma associated with a criminal
record).
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.A.
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prosecution is complete.13 The expungement phase is an area where the
prosecutor exercises discretion without necessarily having to make
blameworthiness for a past act the primary metric of the prosecutorial
response.14
A prosecutor has the ability during expungement proceedings to express
the state’s function as advocate of complete justice for all of the parties
involved or, as others have written about with respect to other phases, to act
in a quasi-judicial role.15 Prosecutorial recognition of this ability only comes
after the recognition that arrests alone have the potential to regulate all sorts
of human behavior16 and that convictions—regardless of their grade—
immediately enmesh defendants in a web of collateral consequences.17 Both
contacts with the criminal justice system can cause nearly irreversible
damage to the reputation of a defendant.
Thus, while expungement is normally classified as a judicial remedy18 and,
in some places, a nonadversarial process,19 the discretion of both the trial
judge and the prosecutor is often at play. In practice, judges often wait to
hear whether the line prosecutor supports the defendant’s motion, or at least
will not oppose it.20 And that is after the granting of a hearing on the merits
of a petition, usually due to a prosecutorial objection.21 In some jurisdictions,
13. Interestingly, the comments to Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
speak of a prosecutor’s responsibility as a “minister of justice.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N, Discussion Draft 1983). To my knowledge, no
searching analysis has been conducted into whether prosecutorial notions of justice do, or
should, include theoretical accounts of the concept of mercy. The focus on justice is the norm,
despite a significant history in the western philosophical tradition that recognizes a link
between justice and mercy. See generally David Dolinko, Some Naïve Thoughts About Justice
and Mercy, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 349 (2007) (detailing how understanding the relationship
between justice and mercy stretches back to Aristotle). Of course, discussions about mercy
have occurred about the role of the executive when it comes to exercising the pardon power.
See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics, and Collar Buttons: Reflections on
the President’s Duty to Be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483, 1485–86 (2000). But an indepth discussion of the prosecutorial role as an advocate of mercy postconviction, within the
American constitutional structure, does not exist. See infra Part III.A.
14. This concept has been discussed in other criminal procedure contexts. See Fred C.
Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After Convictions, 58 VAND. L. REV.
171, 176 (2005).
15. See generally infra Part II.
16. Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 820–25 (2015).
17. See MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2013); see also Brian M. Murray, Beyond the
Right to Counsel: Increasing Notice of Collateral Consequences, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139,
1150 n.56 (2015); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy
in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 287 n.45 (2011).
18. MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A
CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE 113–24 (2006) (surveying
judicial postconviction remedies, including expungement).
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. The author recalls his time as a legal aid attorney filing expungement motions to erase
arrest information for charges that had been dismissed, nolle prossed, or withdrawn. On many
occasions, a line prosecutor objected to expungement based on the alleged facts that had led
to the prosecution. Trial judges were often inclined to consider the objection of the prosecution
based on the recounted facts, even though they rarely had been formally entered into evidence.
21. See infra Part II.A.
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expungement motions do not receive hearings until the defendant has
demonstrated to the prosecutor that the petition is devoid of procedural
error,22 which, for the average, lay, unrepresented petitioner, is no small
order. The prominent role afforded to the prosecutor during expungement
likely stems from a recognition of the multifarious role of the prosecutor,
which includes acting as the arbiter for the extent of punishment exacted on
behalf of the community. Any understanding of the prosecutor as a “minister
of justice” is incomplete if it fails to recognize the enormous responsibility
that comes with exercising discretion after disposition.23
Contemporary examinations of the role of the prosecutor focus almost
exclusively on the exercise of discretion during the charging,24 bargaining,25
and sentencing and conviction review phases.26 This Article seeks to pivot
one step further to consideration of other phases after disposition. It argues
that theoretical conceptions of the prosecutorial role must account for the
power wielded during a phase like expungement, regardless of whether the
underlying prosecution resulted in dismissed charges or a conviction.
Specifically, it claims that prosecutorial discretion relating to an application
for expungement or certificate of rehabilitation27 is as important as the

22. See infra Part II.B.
23. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 174 (noting how the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards
for the Prosecution Function address all stages through sentencing but stop without
consideration for the variety of phases after disposition). Professor Zacharias also noted how
treatises tend to ignore this aspect of the prosecutorial job. Id. (citing BENNETT L. GERSHMAN,
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT §§ 12:12–:32 (2d ed. 1985)).
24. See Margaret McGhee, Preliminary Proceedings, Prosecutorial Discretion, 88 GEO.
L.J. 1057, 1058–59 (2000); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1536–39 (1981) (discussing prosecutors’ vast discretion in directing
scores of law enforcement personnel and “orchestrating” grand jury proceedings); see also
Lynn R. Singband, Note, The Hyde Amendment and Prosecutorial Investigation: The Promise
of Protection for Criminal Defendants, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1967, 1967–68 (2001)
(discussing federal prosecutors’ considerable involvement in the precharging investigation
and virtual free rein over the charging decision).
25. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50, 52–53 (1968); Terance D. Miethe, Charging and Plea Bargaining Practices Under
Determinate Sentencing: An Investigation of the Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion, 78 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155, 156–57 (1987); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale
of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 504–06 (1992) (discussing the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion under the federal sentencing guidelines); Jeffrey Standen, Plea
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (1993); Ian
Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How Mandatory
Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
87, 91–92 (2003).
26. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 173.
27. Certificates of rehabilitation are judicially achieved measures of relief that represent
that an individual with an arrest or conviction record has been effectively rehabilitated and
that the criminal record should not inhibit, by law, that person’s attempts at reentry. Peter
Leasure & Tia Stevens Andersen, The Effectiveness of Certificates of Relief as Collateral
Consequence Relief Mechanisms: An Experimental Study, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER
ALIA 11, 14 (2016). They aim to mitigate or prevent the collateral consequences associated
with having a criminal record. Id. A recent study suggests that they increase the possibility of
employment significantly. See id. at 11, 20.
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discretion relating to what charges to file and how to prosecute.28 This is
because when prosecutors act after disposition, they have the capacity to
bring the theories of punishment that underlie modern criminal justice full
circle. As the Ohio Court of Appeals announced in State v. Boddie29:
We note further that whether to prosecute and what charges to file are
decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor’s discretion. A prosecutor
should remain free to exercise his or her discretion to determine the extent
of the societal interest in prosecution. This discretion is no less important
when applied to issues such as expungement.30

In contrast to Boddie, the current emphasis in academic scholarship
prioritizes the investigative and adjudicative aspects31 of prosecutorial
decision-making at the risk of leaving consequential prosecutorial activity in
the shadows. The emphasis likely results from the common assumption that
decisions about blameworthiness demand the most examination; hence,
notions of professional responsibility remain tethered to the idea that the
prosecutor’s obligations primarily relate to trial, or at least the determination
of guilt or innocence.32 During these conversations, any attention to
discretion postconviction typically focuses on the responsibility of
prosecutors in situations involving factual innocence.33
Even institutional reform and regulatory proposals, like those put forth by
Professors Rachel Barkow, Bruce Green, and the late Fred Zacharias, focus
exclusively on the exercise of discretion in assessing the defendant’s
28. State v. Boddie, 868 N.E.2d 699, 701 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); see also Zacharias, supra
note 14, at 173 (“Prosecutorial discretion is at its height in the postconviction context because
legislators and professional code drafters have not focused on postconviction issues.”).
29. 868 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
30. Id. at 701.
31. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009) (describing the prosecutorial role
as adjudicator in the overwhelming majority of cases and arguing for institutional reforms that
internally regulate prosecutorial behavior); Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas,
Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1, 46 (2012); James Vorenberg, Decent
Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1524–25 (1981); Ronald Wright &
Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 57 (2002); Fred C.
Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do
Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 59–62 (1991).
32. The fact that over 90 percent of dispositions occur as a result of plea bargaining has
led to calls for finding a theoretical justification for an otherwise accepted practice. See
generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969 (1992);
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992).
33. Anna Franceschelli, Motions for Postconviction DNA Testing: Determining the
Standard of Proof Necessary in Granting Requests, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 243, 256 (2003)
(discussing a statute in Washington that gives decision-making authority for postconviction
DNA testing to prosecutors and the state attorney general); Judith A. Goldberg & David M.
Siegel, The Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors in Cases Involving Post-Conviction Claims of
Innocence, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 389, 395 (2002) (discussing the extensive discretion available
to prosecutors after a conviction and proposing guidelines for ethical postconviction decisionmaking); Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction
Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467, 470–71 (2009) (noting that under the
ABA’s model ethics rules, the prosecutor is responsible for bringing new exculpatory evidence
to the attention of the court); Zacharias, supra note 14, at 233 (analyzing prosecutors’
obligation to “do justice” postconviction).
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blameworthiness throughout the investigative and adjudicative process. But
those proposals, while instructive, need reorientation to the expungement
phase for several reasons. First, the distinction between the investigative and
adjudicative aspects of the criminal process is not wholly applicable to an
expungement proceeding. Second, blameworthiness is not the primary
concern during expungement. Third, there is additional complexity
underlying the policy behind expungement since expungement statutes,
unlike other criminal statutes, create a cause of action rather than prohibit
conduct. And fourth, there is substantive and procedural variety across the
fifty expungement regimes, not to mention the resource challenges at the state
level.34
Concerns about the procedural rights of the accused relating to guilt
determinations, which animate Professor Zacharias’s work,35 do not arise in
expungement outside of the fact that many expungement petitions are filed
pro se.36 And, while informative, the structural proposals put forth by
Professor Barkow to counteract biased and predisposed decision-making37
do not neatly apply because expungement is not entirely adjudicative.
Rather, expungement implicates both the investigative and adjudicative
functions because law enforcement might find criminal record history
information useful in the future, and because the merits of mitigating the
arguably punitive effect of a criminal record remain an issue.
As such, while many have recognized that “charging . . . is sentencing,”38
not enough attention has been paid to how opposing expungement, or
responding to other restoration measures, often leads to regulation beyond
payment of the defendant’s debt due to the array of collateral consequences
associated with arrests and convictions. And the incentives that challenge
prosecutors to be fair in other contexts manifest themselves in this one as
well. Prosecutorial responses to expungement intrinsically relate to the
validity of punishment and to the regulation of reentry,39 thereby implicating
the line between doing justice and pursuing and preserving convictions.
Confining analyses of prosecutorial discretion to stages, where the latter
pursuit is more visible but no more significant, is short sighted. This is
34. For example, Eric Fish has argued for prosecutorial agencies to adopt clear policies
identifying when prosecutors should act as advocates versus neutral administrators. Fish
concedes that adoption of his proposal is easier at the federal level given the available
resources. Eric S. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 244–67
(2017).
35. See generally Zacharias, supra note 14.
36. Fish, supra note 34, at 258 (advocating for prosecutors to act as quasi judges when
defendants do not have counsel).
37. See generally Barkow, supra note 31.
38. Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reform, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 150, 171 (2012); see also Douglas Berman, Afternoon Keynote Address: Encouraging
(and Even Requiring) Prosecutors to Be Second-Look Sentencers, 19 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L.
REV. 429, 429 (2010) (“Through their charging and bargaining decisions, prosecutors now
serve as what I would call ‘first-look sentencers’ who frame and structure precisely what type
and length of sentence a defendant will face.”).
39. There is reason to believe that prosecutors should be more open to expungement even
if they operate from “tough on crime” and public safety assumptions. Clear background
checks lessen the likelihood of recidivism. See Denver, supra note 4, at 196.
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especially so given that a decision about the maintenance of criminal record
information after adjudication can have a pervasive, pejorative effect on the
livelihood of an arrestee or ex-offender.40
Put simply, there are several reasons why prosecutorial responses to
expungement matter for the overall workings of the criminal justice system,
especially its fidelity to the punishment norms driving it. Prosecutors can
ensure or frustrate the punishment objectives associated with a criminal
prosecution, further or subvert the regulatory and policy goals of the
legislature and executive agencies, and act as a force for rehabilitation and
restoration in the wake of retribution or suspicion that resulted in arrest. The
following set of questions indicates the range of issues embedded within the
exercise of discretion during expungement proceedings: When faced with an
expungement petition, how should a prosecutor respond procedurally?
Should the prosecutor adopt a nonadversarial position when deciding what to
do? Should the prosecutor advocate on behalf of the defendant, especially if,
in the case of a conviction, the sentence has been completed? In the case of
an arrest that did not result in charges, or nonconviction information, should
the prosecutor support expungement? If not, what are legitimate reasons for
arguing to retain nonconviction information? How much expunged or
shielded information should prosecutors be allowed to use? Is using
expunged information, even if allowed by statute, unjust or unethical?
Should it be? What principles, if any, should govern the prosecutor’s position
on the expungement? This sampling of questions—unasked to date by any
ethical, scholarly, or judicial body—calls for careful analysis to decipher the
blurry line between the prosecutor’s quasi-judicial and adversarial role in a
context that is neither wholly investigative nor adjudicative. An adequate
theoretical framework for conceptualizing prosecutorial responsibility in this
arena is necessary to help prosecutors pursue justice.41
The contributions of this Article are both descriptive and normative. First,
this Article identifies the significant discretion afforded to prosecutors during
expungement by cataloguing different expungement regimes across state
jurisdictions. Second, it juxtaposes these responsibilities with the incentives
normally at play in prosecutors’ offices. Recognizing that current scholarly
40. Appelbaum, supra note 2; Tina Rosenberg, Have You Ever Been Arrested? Check
Here, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/opinion/have-youever-been-arrested-check-here.html [https://perma.cc/3C8J-QGEC].
41. It is true that an antecedent question might exist: Why involve prosecutors at all in a
decision that might be better left to neutral decision makers? Some of my colleagues have
suggested making expungement proceedings analogous to parole board hearings. However,
this Article’s primary purpose is to identify the current landscape and identify an appropriate
response that falls within the existing adversarial system of criminal adjudication where the
prosecutor holds most of the cards. Given that expungement is largely a matter of statutory
law grafted onto an existing adversarial system, it is highly unlikely that the prosecutor will
be entirely removed from its procedural requirements. Beyond that, there may also be sound
reasons for prosecutors to remain involved: they may represent constituencies that would
otherwise not have a voice, such as victims, and they are, in most instances, the democratic
representative for the community. Even within this existing framework, however, there is no
reason why state regimes cannot tailor prosecutorial involvement to the specific concerns and
values of the community that the prosecutor purports to serve.
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analyses of prosecutorial discretion are useful but ultimately leave a void in
this area, it builds a theoretical framework for assessing prosecutorial action
related to expungement. Put simply, this Article shines a light on the
existence, character, importance, and implications of the prosecutor’s
unexamined expungement discretion.
To accomplish this, this Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes why
expungement matters by examining the effects of criminal record history
information and the scope of available expungement remedies to mitigate
harm from those records. In the process, it illustrates the significance of
prosecutorial discretion by pointing to what is at stake for those who request
expungement. Next, Part II analyzes the various responsibilities of
prosecutors relating to expungement in current state statutory schemes. First,
it identifies the responsibilities possessed by prosecutors in expungement
regimes nationwide, focusing on the procedural and substantive implications
of this previously unexamined discretion. Second, it discusses how
traditional norms and incentives in prosecutors’ offices suggest certain
approaches to expungement. Third, it analyzes how current understandings
of the prosecutor as a “minister of justice” fail to provide guidance for
prosecutorial discretion in this area. Part III then proposes that many of the
principles considered useful in other contexts can inform decision-making in
the expungement realm to provide a deeper account of prosecutorial
responsibility. But it argues that conceptualizing the prosecutor as a quasi
judge is crucial for adequate decision-making in the expungement context.
This is because determining blameworthiness is no longer the primary
consideration driving the process, and the prosecutor should be cognizant of
the policy goals underlying a statutory remedy for ex-offenders. This Article
concludes with proposals for improving decision-making in this area;
prosecutors can better design their offices to allow for execution of the quasijudicial role and statutes can clarify the role of the prosecutor in light of the
policy objectives behind the statute.
I. WHY EXPUNGEMENT MATTERS
This Part begins with a discussion of the prevalence of criminal records
collected in the United States and the devastating impacts such records can
have on the employment opportunities and other life prospects for those who
possess them. It goes on to discuss the history and merits of expunging a
criminal record and surveys recent state law reforms aimed at improving
access to expungement as a remedy.
A. Criminal Records: Pervasive and Significant
The overwhelmingly negative effect of a criminal record is undeniable.
That effect is felt by almost one-third of Americans who possess some type
of a criminal record.42 Mass criminalization has resulted in a class of
42. Rodriguez & Emsellem, supra note 9, at 1 (noting that over 25 percent of the adult
population has a criminal record); see also Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest
Records Rise, Americans Find Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18,
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individuals that have been branded despite the commission of relatively
minor crimes.43 Many of these offenders have been convicted of
misdemeanors and order-maintenance offenses—such as disorderly
conduct—which, given the complex array of consequences that result from a
conviction, render full reentry into society nearly impossible.44
Criminal records vary depending on the underlying conduct of the
defendant who has been arrested, charged, and possibly convicted. The
volume of these records is overwhelming: the FBI adds over ten thousand
names to its database each day, with close to eighty million individuals in the
FBI criminal database, which includes information related to arrests and
convictions.45 Additionally, states have databases that catalogue criminal
record history information.46 In some circumstances, states mandate
dissemination of this information; in others, they distribute records freely or
by sale.47 Private commercial databases make a significant amount of money
trafficking in this information.48
Arrest information is the most common type of criminal record and the
most common form of criminal information eligible for expungement.49
Sixty-five million adult Americans have an arrest record.50 The numbers for
men in minority groups are equally staggering as close to 50 percent of black
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-arrest-records-rise-americans-find-consequences-canlast-a-lifetime-1408415402 [https://perma.cc/MVU2-KL4T] (stating that “America has a rap
sheet”); Jo Craven McGinty, How Many Americans Have a Police Record? Probably More
than You Think, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-manyamericans-have-a-police-record-probably-more-than-you-think-1438939802
[https://perma.cc/6QML-LGQC].
43. Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089,
1090–94 (2013); see also Roberts, supra note 6, at 325 (“The problem is thus better
characterized as one of mass criminalization.”).
44. Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 9, at 1721 (noting how prosecutors, on average,
decline to prosecute minor charges at a lower rate than more serious offenses, and that minor
convictions can have dramatic consequences).
45. Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 42.
46. Jain, supra note 16, at 824 (“Every state now either requires or permits criminal
histories to be released to noncriminal justice agencies, such as those that grant licenses and
provide social services.”).
47. James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 387, 395 (2006) (“[T]here are laws in every state mandating or authorizing
the release of individual criminal history records to certain non-criminal justice government
agencies—agencies charged with granting licenses to individuals and firms in diverse
businesses, ranging from liquor stores and bars to banks and private security firms as well as
to agencies that provide programs and services to vulnerable populations including children,
the elderly, and the handicapped.”).
48. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY
BACKGROUND CHECKS 2 (2006), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ag_bgchecks_
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LCF-YZBA] (noting that most private employers conduct
background searches through private enterprises or through commercial databases that
aggregate criminal records).
49. See Second Chance Reforms in 2017: Roundup of New Expungement and Restoration
Laws, supra note 6, at 6–18.
50. Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 963, 964 (2013). By age twenty-three, 33 percent of “adults can expect to be arrested.”
Jain, supra note 16, at 817. For black and Hispanic men, that statistic is closer to 50 percent.
Id.
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and Latino men will be arrested by age twenty-three.51 And the FBI database
mentioned above is approaching 250 million arrests.52 Arrest information is
held by various government agencies53 and commercial databases54 in the
business of proliferating criminal record history information.
Misdemeanor arrests are the most common, and the number of arrest
records is overwhelming.55 In effect, the vast majority of new criminal cases
each year are misdemeanors.56 Law enforcement officers can arrest based
on probable cause,57 and there are few procedural checks postarrest to
prevent formalization of charges.58 These arrests often occur without full
mindfulness of their relation to efficient and holistic policing.59 Rather, the
predominant interests driving an arrest, such as restraining a defendant who
broke the law, interrogation, gathering evidence, and clearing administrative
items—such as warrants—are not entirely consistent with “harm efficient
policing.”60 While these arrests are typically not publicized because they are
relatively minor, they are also the type of criminal record history information
that is stored and disseminated at a later time, which hurts the defendant.61
51. Robert Brame et al., Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest Prevalence by Ages
18 and 23, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 478 (2014). This number is greater than the records
stemming from conviction because many arrests never lead to conviction.
52. Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 42.
53. It is not uncommon for various executive agencies, as well as the court system of a
particular jurisdiction, to retain arrest information.
54. James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of
Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 186 (2008) (“An internet search for
‘criminal records’ yields dozens of companies offering, for a modest fee, to carry out criminal
background checks for employment, housing, and other purposes. These companies are
somewhat regulated by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).”).
55. R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF
STATE COURTS:
AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 24 (2012),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/other-pages/~/media/microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/
csp_dec.ashx [https://perma.cc/YM2S-H3W6] (showing that misdemeanors significantly
outnumber felonies in the criminal caseloads of seventeen selected states); R. LAFOUNTAIN ET
AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS
OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS
47 (2010), http://www.courtstatistics.org/
Other-Pages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC-2008-Online.ashx
[https://perma.cc/
Y7AB-ZL9H] (citing 2008 data from eleven states and describing misdemeanor cases as
comprising an “overwhelming majority of criminal caseloads”).
56. Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass
Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1804 n.78 (2012).
57. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
58. Gary L. Anderson, The Preliminary Hearing—Better Alternatives or More of the
Same, 35 MO. L. REV. 281, 281–83 (1970); Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury
and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 463, 468–69, 498 (1980). See generally William Ortman, Probable Cause Revisited, 68
STAN. L. REV. 511 (2016) (discussing ways to define probable cause).
59. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 776–81 (2012)
(arguing that constitutional rules regarding making arrests do not account for the complex
array of interests related to crime control).
60. Id. at 792.
61. This point cannot be emphasized enough. Some critics of expungement argue that the
remedy is obsolete given the internet age and the availability of the information through news
outlets or other websites and that First Amendment values cut against the remedy entirely. See,
e.g., Doris DelTosto Brogan, Expungement, Defamation, and False Light: Is What Happened
Before What Really Happened or Is There a Chance for a Second Act in America?, 49 LOY.
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Arrests have real consequences both inside and outside of the criminal
justice system. Noncriminal actors use arrest information related to a
particular defendant or overall as a screening mechanism62 and to monitor
and regulate behavior.63 In the criminal arena, arrest information affects
various stakeholders. First, arrestees face immediate, short-term deprivations
of liberty that can instantly disrupt their lives.64 An arrestee might miss a
shift at work, a deadline to pay rent, or the ability to attend a funeral. Given
that state prosecutions can arise through the filing of information,65
prosecution is likely. And prosecution might result in a conviction that has
dramatic consequences on the individual’s life. The mere process associated
with prosecution can sometimes be more painful than the punishment
inflicted postconviction.66

U. CHI. L.J. 1, 23 (2017). The first criticism assumes too much—that the average, low-level
criminal charge makes its way into the public consciousness via the internet forever. The
reality is that the order-maintenance offenses that Professor Bowers has written frequently
about are not the stuff of front-page news, especially the news preserved in perpetuity; rather,
they result in the charges and convictions that appear on background checks due to the
relationship between the reporting agency and the state. Expungement at least prevents that
appearance. The second objection—undercutting First Amendment values such as
transparency and notice—seems overblown upon a close reading of many of the seminal cases.
The Supreme Court has endorsed a distinction between access and publicity that often gets
lost in the internet age, when access and publicity are treated as synonymous. See DOJ v.
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 776–80 (1989) (holding that the
release of FBI rap sheet information to third parties could constitute an unwarranted invasion
of privacy and thus was exempt from Freedom of Information Act disclosure requirements);
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580–81 (1980) (stating that absent an
articulated overriding interest, criminal trials must be open to the public); Nixon v. Warner
Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608–10 (1978) (holding that the district court was not required
to release tape recordings admitted into evidence during the Watergate investigation to the
media). As these cases demonstrate, the Court has never held that imposing some burden on
a party in order to obtain information is per se constitutionally problematic, nor has it taken
issue with requiring individuals to visit the courthouse, dig through mounds of paper, and
search tons of records in order to obtain criminal record history information. But even if the
modern-day Court were to take this view, it would have to grapple with the argument that
there may be a competing constitutional interest in reintegration and reentry, or even
reputation, that requires careful balancing. See, e.g., Joy Radice, The Reintegrative State, 66
EMORY L.J. 1315, 1332–50 (2017) (arguing that states have a strong interest, if not an
obligation, to reintegrate people with criminal convictions back into society).
62. Jain, supra note 16, at 810 (“A number of actors outside the criminal justice system,
such as immigration enforcement officials, public housing authorities, public benefits
administrators, employers, licensing authorities, social services providers, and education
officials, among others, routinely receive and review arrest information. These actors use
arrest information for their own purposes and in ways that are distinct from the aims of the
criminal justice system.”).
63. Id. at 812 (“Arrests provide a way to monitor individuals, to evaluate whether the
arrested individual falls into a regulatory priority, and ultimately to determine whether to
modify a preexisting social or legal arrangement.”).
64. Id. at 842–43 (describing how the defendant might have practical interests, such as
childcare, immediately stalled due to being in custody).
65. James R. Beck, Note, Initiation of Prosecution by Information—Leave of Court or
Preliminary Examination?, 25 MONT. L. REV. 135, 135–36 (1963).
66. MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 30–31 (1992).
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Arrests also affect communities by shaping their perceptions of justice.67
Statistics demonstrate that arrests might result in disproportionate harm to
minorities.68 Arrests also have serious financial costs for the community
because they initiate a series of procedures postarrest that occur before
prosecution even begins.69 Those commitments cost money and take time
away from other law enforcement efforts.
Arrests also implicate actors in the civil context. Sharing arrest
information allows noncriminal actors to pursue alternative, noncriminal
regulatory goals, especially in an area of the law such as immigration.70
Immigration Customs and Enforcement (ICE) uses arrests to identify
immigrants for removal proceedings.71 Public housing authorities use arrest
information to make eligibility determinations and identify whether leases
should be renewed.72 In the employment context, employers routinely use
arrest information to screen applicants.73 This is one reason why
municipalities throughout the country have adopted “ban the box” ordinances
restricting an employer’s ability to inquire into a job applicant’s criminal

67. The lawfulness, utility, or wisdom of an arrest has the capacity to affect how
individuals and communities perceive the administration of justice. See Jacinta M. Gau & Rod
K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance Policing: A Study of Inner-City
Young Men’s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 27 JUST. Q. 255, 272 (2010).
68. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration
in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004) (discussing how mass
imprisonment harms African American communities).
69. Jain, supra note 16, at 823.
70. Id. at 826–29 (describing how immigration authorities and agencies use arrest
information to enforce immigration norms and rules).
71. Secure Communities: Get the Facts, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://web.archive.org/web/20140910121059/http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/getthe-facts.htm (“Through April 30, 2015, more than 283,000 convicted criminal aliens were
removed from the United States after identification through Secure Communities.”); see also
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-708, SECURE COMMUNITIES: CRIMINAL ALIEN
REMOVALS INCREASED, BUT TECHNOLOGY PLANNING IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED 14 (2012),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592415.pdf [https://perma.cc/FMH2-H795] (stating that
approximately 20 percent of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) removals in 2010
and the early part of 2011 were attributed to Secure Communities). It is quite common for
ICE to detain an individual upon learning of an arrest within the state system. Immigration
Detainers, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights/ice-and-border-patrolabuses/immigration-detainers [https://perma.cc/5ZYX-C27G] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018)
(“An ICE detainer is a written request that a local jail or other law enforcement agency detain
an individual for an additional 48 hours (excluding weekends and holidays) after his or her
release date in order to provide ICE agents extra time to decide whether to take the individual
into federal custody for removal purposes.”).
72. Jain, supra note 16, at 835 (“[C]ontact with the criminal justice system serves as the
first step in a screening process that may lead to eviction.”). Housing authorities use arrests
to see whether particular tenants or those they host might be engaging in activity that would
lead to ineligibility. Id.
73. See Background Checking: Conducting Criminal Background Checks, SOC’Y FOR
HUM. RESOURCES MGMT. (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.slideshare.net/shrm/background-checkcriminal [https://perma.cc/X6BM-BHFY] (slide three); Memorandum from Brian P. Ritchie,
Office of Inspector Gen., to Marilyn Tavenner, Ctr. For Medicaid & Medicare Servs., State
Requirements for Conducting Background Checks on Home Health Agency Employees (May
29, 2014), http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-07-14-00131.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6MKRBSD].
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past, although their utility has been questioned.74 Employers also use arrest
information to monitor the activities of employees—both on and off the job.75
Locating the information allows employers to engage in investigations
themselves, which at times can lead to unnecessary adverse employment
actions.76 Finally, many licensing agencies use arrest information to inhibit
entry into a profession or trade requiring a license.77 In short, arrest
information allows for coordination between levels of government to enforce
immigration goals and public policy measures.78
While an arrest can result in many problems, having a conviction is
essentially catastrophic given the number of disadvantages that could
automatically or potentially result. In 2010, about 10 percent of adult males
and 25 percent of black males in the population had a felony conviction.79
Immediate consequences, often deemed “collateral,” can include the loss of
civil rights, such as voting; eligibility for public privileges and benefits, such
as public housing; and the ability to find gainful employment given the social
stigma that comes with a conviction.80 In fact, many states—as well as the
federal government—have enacted statutes and regulations expressly
prohibiting ex-offenders from obtaining certain jobs.81 Those prohibitions
74. Beth Avery & Phil Hernandez, Ban the Box: U.S. Cities, Counties, and States Adopt
Fair
Hiring
Policies,
NAT’L
EMP.
L.
PROJECT
(Feb.
8,
2018),
http://www.nelp.org/publication/ban-the-box-fair-chance-hiring-state-and-local-guide/
[https://perma.cc/C7RS-Y9SU] (noting how thirty states have adopted “ban the box” laws or
policies). Some have argued that ban the box measures are not necessarily the most effective
in mitigating the effect of arrest records. See, e.g., Amanda Y. Agan & Sonja B. Starr, Ban the
Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical Discrimination: A Field Experiment (Univ. of Mich.
Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. 16-012, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2795795 [https://perma.cc/JLJ9-HWTT].
75. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 915.002, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:
CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 6 (2012), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/
guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf [https://perma.cc/989G-9H9L] (“In one survey, a total
of 92% of responding employers stated that they subjected all or some of their job candidates
to criminal background checks. Employers have reported that their use of criminal history
information is related to ongoing efforts to combat theft and fraud, as well as heightened
concerns about workplace violence and potential liability for negligent hiring. Employers also
cite federal laws as well as state and local laws as reasons for using criminal background
checks.” (footnotes omitted)); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC.
937 (2003) (discussing the effect of a criminal record on barriers to employment).
76. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AMERICA’S
FAILURE TO FORGIVE OR FORGET IN THE WAR ON CRIME 36–37 (2014),
https://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=33203&libID=33172
[https://perma.cc/7TP3-GDZT] (discussing the role of negligent-hiring torts in background
checks).
77. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 75, at 12 (“An arrest, however,
may in some circumstances trigger an inquiry into whether the conduct underlying the arrest
justifies an adverse employment action.”).
78. Jain, supra note 16, at 830–32.
79. Appelbaum, supra note 2.
80. Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical Guide to Padilla
v. Kentucky, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2010, at 21, 22.
81. See CMTY. LEGAL SERVS. OF PHILA., LEGAL REMEDIES AND LIMITATIONS:
EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS IN PENNSYLVANIA 5–11 (2016),
https://clsphila.org/sites/default/files/issues/Legal%20Remedies%20and%20Limitations%20

2018]

UNSTITCHING SCARLET LETTERS?

2837

typically exist in tandem with statutes that impliedly allow consideration of
arrest and conviction records by employers, without much restriction.82 In
terms of public benefits, convictions render many individuals ineligible for
welfare assistance,83 medical benefits,84 and unemployment benefits.85 A
conviction may also affect eligibility for public housing.86 While more
consequences of having a conviction could be mentioned, the literature
describing such consequences is voluminous and need not be repeated here.87

on%20the%20Employment%20of%20People%20with%20Criminal%20Records%20in%20
Pennsylvania-%20May%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/853L-QWAP] (noting how individuals
with certain types of convictions cannot seek employment at airports, banks, insurance
companies, long-term care facilities, and schools, or even at certain security positions);
Roberts, supra note 17, at 287 n.41.
82. See generally State Laws and Their Impact on Use of Criminal Records for
Employment Purposes, GEN. INFO. SERVICES (2007), https://hr.4act.com/documents/State_
Laws_and_Their_Impact_on_Use_of_Criminal_Records_for_Emplo.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2L7W-Z6HZ].
83. 21 U.S.C. § 862a(1)(A) (2012).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(4), (b)(3) (2012).
85. See, e.g., 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 802(g) (2018); see also id. § 871(b) (noting the
implications of making false representations when applying for unemployment benefits or
changes in those benefits).
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 13662(a) (2012); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 780-167(b) (2018) (detailing
the impact of a final criminal conviction in a drug-related offense on eviction proceedings).
87. Murray, supra note 17, at 1157–58 (citing a study regarding systemic literacy of
collateral consequences); Roberts, supra note 17, at 287 nn.40–45. See generally LOVE ET AL.,
supra note 17; National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, COUNCIL ST.
GOVERNMENTS
JUST.
CTR.,
https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/
[https://perma.cc/
D6P6-B3VV] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
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When disseminated, criminal record history information has a punitive88
and regulatory effect89 that is extremely detrimental.90 Thus, prosecutorial
decisions in this context implicate the exaction of punishment and the
regulation of future conduct by former defendants. As such, the treatment of
criminal records after prosecution is inherently part of the prosecutorial
function. But to adequately gauge the prosecutorial role in this regard, a
discussion of the purpose of expungement, the current state of the law, and
how these two factors relate to the underlying purposes of the criminal justice
system and punishment is in order.
B. Expungement as a Remedy
Expungement law has been developing for nearly eight decades.91 Its
primary focus is restoration; the elimination or sealing92 of a criminal record
removes information from the public’s reach or eyesight while permitting the
ex-offender to carve a new identity—or at least to cover up the branding that
has occurred so that only a select few, in limited circumstances, can unveil
88. See, e.g., Sarah B. Berson, Beyond the Sentence—Understanding Collateral
Consequences, NAT’L INST. JUST., Sept. 2013, at 25, 26; Chin & Love, supra note 80, at 22;
Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 153–54 (1999) (arguing that
collateral consequences are “de facto punishment”); Alec Ewald & Christopher Uggen, The
Collateral Effects of Imprisonment on Prisoners, Their Families, and Communities, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 83, 93–94 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R.
Reitz eds., 2012); Wayne A. Logan, Populism and Punishment: Sex Offender Registration
and Community Notification in the Courts, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2011, at 37, 38–39 (labeling
Smith v. Doe, in which the Supreme Court held that Alaska’s sex-offender registry law was
nonpunitive, a “Dubious Doctrine”); McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A
Criminal Defense Attorney’s Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy,
36 U. TOL. L. REV. 479, 479 n.2 (2005) (“[C]alling these consequences ‘collateral’ is merely a
legal fiction—the person experiences the consequences as punishments regardless of the
label.”); Andrea E. Yang, Comment, Historical Criminal Punishments, Punitive Aims and Un“Civil” Post-Custody Sanctions on Sex Offenders: Reviving the Ex Post Facto Clause as a
Bulwark of Personal Security and Private Rights, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1299, 1322–23 (2007).
89. In recent years, there has been a dispute about whether collateral consequences should
be understood as forms of punishment or as civil effects of an arrest or conviction. While
most commentators have argued forcefully for recognizing them as extensions of punishment,
given their incapacitating effect, collateral consequences might be considered regulatory
measures as well because they essentially restrict behavior of ex-offenders by classifying them
according to risk potential. Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive
State, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 301, 303 (2015) (arguing for understanding collateral
consequences as regulatory measures assessing future risk rather than penal measures
involving judgments of culpability). While an interesting philosophical discussion in its own
right, whether either side is correct is probably immaterial for the argument in this Article
given that expungement as a remedy lies at the intersection of how criminal records implicate
criminal and civil policy objectives.
90. Corda, supra note 10, at 15–17.
91. Fred C. Zacharias, The Uses and Abuses of Convictions Set Aside Under the Federal
Youth Corrections Act, 1981 DUKE L.J. 477, 482–84 (discussing juvenile expungement
measures as responses to the desire to rehabilitate youth offenders).
92. Expungement, while in effect resulting in the elimination of the information from the
public eye, can either mean full destruction of the record or merely hiding it from the public
while still granting access to certain parties, such as law enforcement. Murray, supra note 5,
at 362.
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it.93 In order to fully situate prosecutorial responsibility as it relates to
expungement, the following Parts articulate the nature and purposes of
expungement, the current state of the law, and the prospects for future
developments.
1. History, Theory, and Purposes
Lord Coke said that “punishment can terminate, [but] guilt endures
forever.”94 The policy behind expungement is to provide offenders another
chance95 at building an identity by allowing them to move on from the past.96
There is debate over its philosophical merits. On the one hand, the policy
objectives behind the remedy are noble: ex-offenders are offered an
opportunity at restoration, the first step of which is rebuilding their name.97
Sympathetic policymakers probably contributed to the large-scale, relatively
uncritical welcoming of expungement as a remedy.98 At the same time,
erasing or shielding information arguably smacks of Orwellian whitewashing
and undermines the public’s capacity to know and act on the truth.99 As such,
expungement implicates certain constitutional norms, such as freedom of

93. This is why some laws consider expungement to be the erasure or elimination of
information whereas others define expungement as the “sealing” of information. Id. at 369–
73.
94. Barry M. Portnoy, Employment of Former Criminals, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 306, 306
(1970) (quoting Brown v. Crashaw (1614) 80 Eng. Rep. 1028, 1028 (KB)).
95. State v. N.W., 747 A.2d 819, 823 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (discussing how
the purpose of the expungement statute was to provide an offender with a “second chance”).
96. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1417 (2017) (restoring the privileges and rights of
an individual and directing that the record “shall not affect any of his or her civil rights or
liberties”); AARON NUSSBAUM, FIRST OFFENDERS—A SECOND CHANCE 24 (1956) (“A theory
of law which withholds the finality of forgiveness after punishment is ended is as indefensible
in logic as it is on moral grounds.”); Aidan R. Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication
Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 162.
97. JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 113–14 (2015) (“The purpose of
this policy . . . is to encourage rehabilitation and to recognize that a previously convicted
offender has succeeded in turning his life around.”); Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over
with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1705, 1708 (2003) (noting how criminal offenders are subject to lifelong prejudice
after formal punishment has ended).
98. See Bernard Kogon & Donald L. Loughery Jr., Sealing and Expungement of Criminal
Records—The Big Lie, 61 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 378, 378 (1970) (“Record
sealing and expungement have been accepted casually and extended uncritically over the
years, prospering in a rosy glow of good intentions and expediency, with little attention to
evaluation of results.”).
99. Concern about access to public information transcends the expungement realm. See,
e.g., Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597–98 (1978); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693, 712 (1976) (holding that there is no due process right that inhibits the government from
disclosing criminal record information); Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 626 (8th Cir. 1996);
Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084, 1085 (5th Cir. 1972) (noting that “[t]he judicial editing
of history is likely to produce a greater harm than that sought to be corrected”); see also
Michael D. Mayfield, Comment, Revisiting Expungement: Concealing Information in the
Information Age, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 1057, 1066 (“For some commentators, one of the major
drawbacks of expungement is that, at its roots, expungement is an institutionalized lie.”).
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speech.100 Technological advancements regarding big data—in terms of its
dissemination and its concealment—complicate this debate.101
But how does expungement, whether pointing toward forgetting or
forgiving, relate to the purposes of criminal law? In theory, an arrest results
from the lawful suspicion of a crime,102 conviction results from an
assessment by a variety of actors (although mostly the prosecutor) of
normative and legal blameworthiness,103 and punishment (again in theory)
results from the assent of the community.104 All three of these events can
lead to the branding of an individual as criminal or a criminal, thereby
automatically drawing a line between that individual and the rest of the
population.105 The principle justification for expungement is that it mitigates
the public ostracism that results from such branding, thereby restoring the
“offender[’s] . . . status quo ante.”106 In the context of an arrest,
expungement cannot counteract the effect of the short-term restraint on
liberty; however, it can counteract the long-term effects of the arrest on one’s

100. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 502 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting
Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)). But see State ex rel. Cincinnati
Enquirer v. Winkler, 805 N.E.2d 1094, 1097–98 (Ohio 2004); State v. D.H.W., 686 So. 2d
1331, 1335–36 (Fla. 1996); see also Marc A. Franklin & Diane Johnsen, Expunging Criminal
Records: Concealment and Dishonesty in an Open Society, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 733, 735
(1981); Kogon & Loughery, supra note 98, at 391 (“Alteration or destruction of the record . . .
only protects the body politic from confrontation regarding its own aberrant attitudes and the
necessity to change. It basically corrupts the fundamental correctional objective of
rehabilitating offenders.”). As such, concerns about expungement involve the premise that
expungement might actually prevent full restoration of the offender because it is an easy way
out and does not require the community and offender to reconcile. This seems like a charge
involving two separate, but related, issues: (1) rules relating to community access to
information and (2) community involvement in the administration of discretion postconviction
(or postarrest). In other words, if expungement proceedings were not the creature of insiders
to criminal adjudication but instead reflected community involvement with the capacity to
express the normative propriety of expungement, that might cure this objection. I am in the
process of working through two ideas related to just that: (1) integrating the community into
the criminal justice system after prosecution is complete and (2) the concept of what might be
called “normative brand worthiness,” which addresses the First Amendment concerns of
communities regarding access to information.
101. See Pierre H. Bergeron & Kimberly A. Eberwine, One Step in the Right Direction:
Ohio’s Framework for Sealing Criminal Records, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 595, 609 (2005) (“[T]he
individual may have to live the rest of his life with a cloud over his head and hope that his
secret is never revealed.”). The fact that there is a dispute over the philosophical merits of
expungement supports the thesis of this Article. An examination of prosecutorial decisionmaking in this context is even more important if the objectives of the state regarding
expungement are less than clear.
102. Ortman, supra note 58, at 559.
103. Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 9, at 1678–80.
104. STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1–9 (2012) (contrasting
community involvement in early American criminal justice with the current divide between
insiders and outsiders).
105. Love, supra note 97, at 1716 (“Permanent changes in a criminal offender’s legal status
serve[] to emphasize his ‘other-ness.’”).
106. Doe v. Utah Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 782 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1989); Mayfield, supra
note 99, at 1057 (“In an attempt to alleviate the effects of such ostracism, and to help offenders
reenter society, federal and state governments created expungement laws designed to conceal
criminal records from the public.”).
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name. Additionally, if the charges were without merit, expungement rectifies
an error in the administration of justice.
The justification for expungement of conviction information is similar, but
it recognizes payment of the debt by the offender and that the road to
rehabilitation is either complete or the path being definitively taken by the
ex-offender.107 Accordingly, once the formal punishment exacted by the
community has ended, the cause of the debt can be forgotten.108 The act of
forgetting enables the former offender to reenter society because readmission
no longer comes with strings attached. In a sense, expungement might be
labeled the completion of the retributive process because it stops the
informal, and perhaps unintentional, effects of formal punishment. As such,
expungement is an extension of the proportionality principle underlying
retribution because it forecloses continued and unsubstantiated retribution.109
Expungement operates to reintegrate after punishment, furthering what
others have referred to as restorative retribution.110
Theories behind expungement also emphasize its relation to incapacitation
and rehabilitation. Expungement may lead to the formal restoration of certain
rights and privileges, thereby increasing the capabilities of the ex-offender
Additionally, expungement can both result from
upon reentry.111
rehabilitation and continue to develop it.112 It can allow the ex-offender to
107. This is one reason why expungement procedures are often cumbersome for petitioners.
In another project, “The Process Prevents Expungement,” I will analyze how substantive
reform of expungement law has not occurred in tandem with procedural reform, thereby
undermining the promise of recent efforts.
108. Linda S. Buethe, Comment, Sealing and Expungement of Criminal Records: Avoiding
the Inevitable Social Stigma, 58 NEB. L. REV. 1087, 1089–90 (1979) (“[W]hen a conviction
does occur and the individual has served time and paid a fine, then is it not true that the
offender has ‘paid his debt to society?’”).
109. HYMAN GROSS, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 436 (1979). Of course, this assumes
that continued existence of a criminal record amounts to punishment. Given the range of
automatic collateral consequences that result from a record and the proliferation of those
records, that is a fair assumption. See Chin & Love, supra note 80, at 24; Chin, supra note 56,
at 1830.
110. BIBAS, supra note 104, at 9 (noting how early American criminal justice inflicted
reintegrative punishment, where “wrongdoers pa[id] their material and moral debts to victims
and society, wipe[d] their slates clean, and return[ed] to the community as equals”). In
documenting early American approaches to reintegration, Bibas describes how convicts in
Middlesex County, Massachusetts, became politicians, constables, clerks, commissioners, and
justices of the peace. Id. at 12.
111. Mayfield, supra note 99, at 1062 (“The underlying philosophy of expungement has
always been to rehabilitate prisoners by providing ‘an accessible or effective means of
restoring social status.’” (quoting Steven K. O’Hern, Note, Expungement: Lies That Can Hurt
You in and out of Court, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 574, 576 (1988)). Mayfield describes how
expungement arguably has roots in utilitarian punishment theory and particularly
rehabilitation theory. Id. (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW
24 (2d ed. 1986)).
112. See Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 329,
334 (2007) (“Offenders value the good will of their fellow human beings. In addition, many
offenders feel the bite of conscience for their misdeeds. . . . Forgiveness may lighten the
burden of guilt from their shoulders, making it easier for them to move on with their lives.”);
Gough, supra note 96, at 162 (noting how expungement gives youth offenders “an incentive
to reform” by “removing the infamy of [their] social standing”); Love, supra note 97, at 1710
(“The purpose of judicial expungement or set-aside was to both encourage and reward
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experience rehabilitative activities potentially not available when the exoffender has a conviction attached to his or her name. As will be
demonstrated below, courts routinely look into the condition of the offender
when assessing whether expungement is appropriate.113 In this regard, others
have justified expungement because it simultaneously encourages and allows
for rehabilitation.114
2. Expungement Then and Now
Although nearly every state allows for expungement, the available
remedies vary greatly by jurisdiction. They are entirely the creature of state
law.115 Historically, expungement was only available for arrest information
where the prosecution did not result in conviction.116 The cause of action—
or basis for an expungement petition—was usually a hodgepodge of statutory
law and judicially created remedies.117
In the past, expungement remedies almost always existed when the
disposition was uniquely favorable to the accused—generally acquittal or
dropped charges.118 Today, most state jurisdictions allow for the
expungement or sealing of such nonconviction information.119 Considering
the breadth of arrest information collected,120 the expungement remedy could
rehabilitation, by restoring social status as well as legal rights.”); Zacharias, supra note 14, at
181–82; Mayfield, supra note 99, at 1063–64 (“Expungement, then, may be conceptualized as
a natural step in rehabilitation that allows an offender to become sufficiently reformed through
reintegration into society.”).
113. See infra Part II.B.
114. JACOBS, supra note 97, at 114 (“After a certain period of crime-free behavior, the exoffender has demonstrated that he has put his past offending behind him and deserves
reinstatement as a citizen in good standing.”).
115. Recently, there has been some proposed legislation at the federal level as part of the
REDEEM Act. See Press Release, Senator Cory Booker, Paul, Booker, Cummings Introduce
Bipartisan, Bicameral Bill to Fix Broken Criminal Justice System (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://www.booker.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=573 [https://perma.cc/PM7L-GBM5].
116. See Joseph C. Dugan, I Did My Time: The Transformation of Indiana’s Expungement
Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1321, 1335 (2015) (noting that “individuals could petition for expungement
if they were arrested and released without charge or if the charges filed against them were
dropped due to mistaken identity, no offense in fact, or absence of probable cause”); see also
LOVE, supra note 18, at 113–24 (surveying judicial postconviction remedies, including
expungement). For example, as of 2006, Wisconsin only allowed expungement of
misdemeanor convictions if they occurred before the offender was twenty-one. Id. at 124.
117. Pennsylvania is an example of this hybrid legal regime. Pennsylvania has an
expungement statute that was inspired by mid- to late twentieth century court decisions. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 1981). Minnesota’s regime was
initially similar. See generally Jon Geffen & Stefanie Letze, Chained to the Past: An Overview
of Criminal Expungement Law in Minnesota—State v. Schultz, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1331, 1344 n.96 (2005) (describing the history of expungement law in Minnesota). In 1977,
the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that expungement was an equitable remedy
under the state constitution. In re R.L.F., 256 N.W.2d 803, 807–08 (Minn. 1977). Four years
later, it legitimized trial court expungement. State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. 1981).
118. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. D.M., 695 A.2d 770, 773 (Pa. 1997) (granting automatic
expungement of charges resulting in acquittal).
119. LOVE, supra note 18, at 43–61, app. A (cataloguing all jurisdictions that allow for
expungement of nonconviction information).
120. See, e.g., supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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become available to many people, thereby amplifying the significance of the
parties who play a role in its granting or denial. Standards of review vary for
dispositions in between acquittal and conviction, such as nolle prosequi,
dismissal, or withdrawn charges.121 In most instances, however, when a
hearing is granted, courts are tasked with balancing state and private interests
as related to the criminal record history information.122 Petitioners must
demonstrate that they are worthy of expungement against a presumption of
retention of information,123 and only after first overcoming substantial
procedural hurdles.124
Over the last decade, expungement reform has occurred in various
jurisdictions, which has widened the availability of relief. In the last ten
years, over 80 percent of states have tried to create additional expungement
remedies.125 These measures include expanding the types of information,
including convictions, that are eligible for expungement;126 shortening
waiting periods;127 clarifying the legal effect of an expungement with respect
to both an ex-offender’s history and future activities of an ex-offender;128
adding private rights of action against those who mishandle expunged
information;129 and lowering the burdens of proof and persuasion when
121. See LOVE, supra note 18, at 43–61, app. A (noting such regimes in Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Washington, D.C., Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and
Virginia). In fact, Pennsylvania continues to have a regime that distinguishes between types
of nonconviction dispositions, especially in the case of a guilty plea to a lesser charge. For
example, the law treats nolle prossed charges from the same case as a guilty plea differently
than dismissed charges. Compare Commonwealth v. Lutz, 788 A.2d 993, 995 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2001) (holding that dismissed charges that result from a plea deal are components of a quasi
contract and are not entitled to expungement), with Commonwealth v. Hanna, 964 A.2d 923,
925–29 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (holding that nolle prossed charges that accompany a plea deal
to another charge may still be expunged).
122. See, e.g., Meinken v. Burgess, 426 S.E.2d 876, 879 (Ga. 1993); Commonwealth v.
Wexler, 431 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 1981).
123. See Geffen & Lentze, supra note 117, at 1344.
124. Id. (noting that statutory procedures in Minnesota were “intentionally created to be
somewhat cumbersome to help protect the presumption that criminal records remain publicly
available”).
125. See generally RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. FOR JUSTICE, RELIEF IN SIGHT?:
STATES RETHINK THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION, 2009–2014
(2014),
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/relief-insight-states-rethink-the-collateral-consequences-of-criminal-conviction-2009-2014/legacy
_downloads/states-rethink-collateral-consequences-report-v4.pdf [https://perma.cc/NXM73M7X].
126. Since 2011, the following states have made some changes to their expungement law
to allow for expungement of conviction information: California, Colorado, Idaho (juvenile
offenders), Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts (lowered waiting periods),
Minnesota, North Dakota (changed grading), Ohio, Tennessee, Utah (lowered waiting
periods), Vermont, and Wyoming. See generally Restoration of Rights Project, NAT’L ASS’N
CRIM. DEF. LAW., http://restoration.ccresourcecenter.org [https://perma.cc/K85S-PGLD] (last
visited Apr. 13, 2018).
127. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 125, at 14 (“Many states have recognized that overly
long waiting periods place a burden on those simply trying to move on with their lives.”).
128. Id. at 15–16.
129. Id.
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petitioning for expungement.130 The effect of these reforms cannot be
overstated, and citizens and attorneys have begun to respond by prioritizing
expungement in their pro bono work.131 Free clinics offering to assist with
expungement petitions are now common, with hundreds of ex-offenders
desiring assistance.132
Expungement reform has typically been divided into two forms of relief:
(1) “forgetting” measures that aim to “expunge” data in the traditional sense
of the word, meaning erasing or sealing it; and (2) “forgiving” measures,
which aim to alleviate the effects of a criminal record through measures like
certificates of rehabilitation.133 Of course, statutes that lead to forgetting by
definition imply some level of forgiving, and laws that allow for forgiveness
presume some future forgetting.
There are certain trends in recent reforms. First, states are moving toward
expanding the types of information eligible for expungement or sealing.134
The range of criminal record history information that is considered eligible
in various jurisdictions reflects the recognition that low-level misdemeanors
and order-maintenance offenses are overwhelming the system with
catastrophic long-term consequences on individual development and
communities.135 Information now eligible for expungement includes
nonviolent misdemeanor offenses, particularly drug crimes, and other lowlevel convictions.136 These expansions typically involve waiting periods
linked to the perceived severity of the offense, which can range from three to
ten years.137

130. Id. at 17, 21 (noting how some states have decided to remove judicial discretion from
the process and instead automatically provide for expungement if the petitioner meets certain
criteria).
131. See, e.g., Lynh Bui, Fair Offers Free Legal Help for Those Seeking to Clear Their
Records
of
Criminal
Charges,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
12,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/expungement-fair-offers-free-legalhelp-for-those-seeking-to-clear-their-records/2017/01/12/0f4bd84a-d8df-11e6-9a361d296534b31e_story.html? [https://perma.cc/S4JU-DPCE]; Julie Shaw, Philadelphia Bar
Association to Hold Free Criminal Record Expungement Clinic, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 27,
2016),
http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/real-time/Phila-Bar-Association-to-hold-freeexpungement-clinic.html [https://perma.cc/HG8K-PAPC].
132. NLG Expungement Project a Success, TEMPLE U. BEASLEY SCH. L. (Nov. 4, 2014),
https://www.law.temple.edu/news/nlg-expungement-project-success/
[https://perma.cc/
A2SN-S7YM].
133. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4852.01 (West 2018).
134. See Andrea Papagianis, More States Attempting to Seal Criminal Records, REPORTERS
COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/newsmedia-law/news-media-and-law-spring-2012/more-states-attempting-seal [https://perma.cc/
KK7L-5XV4] (article from the spring 2012 edition of News Media and the Law).
135. Bui, supra note 131 (quoting an attorney affiliated with an expungement clinic who
said, “I wonder how many people are laboring along, who are hopeless and discouraged and
may have minor nuisance offenses that they can expunge and they just don’t know”).
136. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-9-2(a)–(b) (West 2018); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 971 (2018) (“The inability to obtain an expungement can prevent certain individuals
from obtaining gainful employment.”); Maryland Second Chance Act of 2015, MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-301(f) (West 2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.02 (West 2018).
137. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-9-2(c); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 977–78 (2018); MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-303; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.02(3)(a)(3).
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Reforms have also attempted to restrict the usage of expunged information.
In Indiana, the law determines availability of expunged records according to
the seriousness of the offense.138 Some more recent state laws prohibit state
entities from automatically disclosing information to the general public139 or
using it during future law enforcement actions.140 These laws also task
governmental entities with sending updated information, or an order of
expungement, to the private databases that hold the information, although
whether private entities that continue to disclose expunged information are
subject to penalties varies by jurisdiction.141
Interestingly, jurisdictions diverge regarding whether expungement should
be automatic in certain situations. Some reforms have allowed for automatic
expungement upon a showing by the petitioner that any procedural hurdles
have been met.142 Others, like Minnesota, continue to defer decision-making
to a judge and call for the balancing of public interests and private
interests.143 In either situation, the prosecutor plays a crucial role. In the
case of potential automatic expungement, prosecutors are often the
gatekeepers for pointing out procedural error in petitions.144 The significance
of this function is remarkable considering that some state reforms, like that
of Maryland, only allow petitioners one bite at the apple.145 If the state allows
for a hearing, prosecutors might object to expungement on either procedural
or substantive grounds. In the latter situation, petitioners may have to
overcome something tantamount to a clear-and-convincing-evidence
standard to bypass the prosecutorial objection.146
Thus, even when the law might provide for automatic expungement, or at
least express a presumption in favor of expungement, the formal and informal
procedural hurdles embedded in the administration of the law provide
mechanisms through which a prosecutor can stall or hasten expungement.
And the prosecutor’s decision-making implicates public policy, theories of
punishment, state interests, and the situation of the offender. The rest of this

138. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-38-9-2 to -4 (noting standards for misdemeanors and felonies);
see also Dugan, supra note 116, at 1341–42 nn.129–37.
139. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-38-9-2 to -4. But see MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10302(b)(2) (allowing dissemination of the information by the state entity upon request from an
employer).
140. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-305.
141. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 974(A) (“A private third-party entity,
excluding a news-gathering organization, that compiles and disseminates criminal history
information for compensation shall not disseminate any information in its possession
regarding an arrest, conviction, or other disposition after it has received notice of an issuance
of a court order to expunge the record of any such arrest or conviction.”).
142. Murray, supra note 5, at 371 (“Like Maryland’s statute, the Louisiana statute limits
judicial discretion: expungement is automatic if the eligibility requirements are met.”). Some
judges have balked at the loss of discretion. See, e.g., Cline v. State, 61 N.E.3d 360, 363 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2016) (noting that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied an expungement
petition that met all statutory requirements).
143. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.03(5)(a)(1)–(12) (West 2018).
144. See infra Part II.A.
145. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-303(e)(4).
146. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.03(5)(c)(1)–(12).

2846

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

Article examines the nature of that involvement in the context of the overall
prosecutorial role.
II. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND EXPUNGEMENT
This Part examines the role of the prosecutor in various state regimes and
moves on to explore three alternative approaches to expungement that
prosecutors might adopt in the expungement realm. It concludes with a
discussion of existing scholarship in this area, arguing that academics have
yet to comprehensively address how prosecutors should pursue justice in the
expungement context.
A. The Power of the Prosecutor Under
Current Expungement Regimes
State legislatures allow prosecutors to wield remarkable influence over the
procedural and substantive aspects of expungement law.147 The authority
afforded prosecutors ranges from an extension of the quasi-judicial
expectations already existing at other phases, to the role of pure adversary
with the power to manipulate process in addition to making substantive
arguments.148 Prosecutors act as the first line of review—they make
determinations as to whether petitions should be heard by a judge, possess
veto authority over petitions, can bargain about expungement rights, and can
assent to quicker relief than otherwise provided by state law.149 How a
prosecutor chooses to engage with each of these responsibilities can be the
difference between a smooth expungement process—and the road to full
reentry—or a bureaucratic, Kafkaesque150 nightmare.
In multiple jurisdictions, prosecutors are the first reviewers after a petition
for expungement is filed, and they can be procedural force fields capable of
blocking relief. In California, a prosecutor’s rejection of an expungement
petition results in its automatic denial; although that denial is appealable, the
cost of the prosecutor’s inaction to the lay petitioner—who has already
navigated significant procedural thickets to file the petition in the first
place—is immeasurable.151
California’s law provides one end of a spectrum. More jurisdictions
resemble that of Georgia, where the prosecutor has ninety days to determine
147. See infra notes 151–66.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. FRANZ KAFKA, Before the Law, in FRANZ KAFKA: THE COMPLETE STORIES 3, 3
(Nahum N. Glatzer ed., Willa & Edwin Muir trans., 1971) (“Before the law stands a
doorkeeper. To this doorkeeper there comes a man from the country and prays for admittance
to the Law. But the doorkeeper says that he cannot grant admittance at the moment. The man
thinks it over and then asks if he will be allowed in later. ‘It is possible,’ says the doorkeeper,
‘but not at the moment.’”).
151. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(b) (West 2018). A significant number of ex-offenders
are indigent, which means that petitioners are also likely to be battling other hurdles—such as
filing fees and costs—at the time of their petition, making the effect of a denial even more
significant. See Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration and Social Inequality,
DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 8, 8.
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whether the petition meets the statutory criteria for expungement; if it does
not, the prosecutor can return the petition to the petitioner with a notice
indicating that the petition failed for procedural reasons.152 The lay petitioner
receiving that response from an agent of the state—who took her liberty at an
earlier date—might naturally feel deterred from pushing harder.
Nevertheless, the burden then shifts to the lay petitioner to demonstrate—by
clear and convincing evidence—that the arrest is eligible for
expungement.153 In other places, prosecutorial consent is necessary simply
to file a petition.154
Prosecutors also have the authority to judge the merits of petitions before
they reach a judge. For example, Colorado lets prosecutors act as referees,
or administrative law judges, prior to judicial involvement.155 If the
prosecutor does not object, expungement is automatic; after an objection, a
petitioner must proceed to an in-person hearing, and it is only then that the
judiciary becomes involved.156
A few states also permit prosecutors to initiate expungements. Delaware
mandates expungement when the prosecutor files the petition.157 When the
prosecutor does not begin the process, the petitioner must show “manifest
injustice” due to the record.158 Interestingly, Hawaii raises the stakes by
vesting absolute expungement authority in the office of the prosecutor: the
judiciary’s reach only extends to court information.159 Prosecutors can
ignore judicial decisions granting expungements for functionally similar
information, forcing petitioners to have to seek erasure of information in
multiple venues. New York has a similar rule for information relating to
arrests that did not result in charges.160 Notice that the above provisions seem
to presume ineligibility for expungement.
While some jurisdictions afford prosecutors the above, first-line-ofdefense responsibilities, the majority of states give prosecutors the ability to
affect the process by which an expungement is pursued and to advocate on
behalf of the state with respect to the petition. In various places, courts can
only expunge without a hearing if there is no initial objection by the

152. GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-37(n)(2) (West 2018).
153. Id. § 35-3-37(n)(3). But see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-704(1)(b)(I) (West 2018)
(allowing judges to determine whether grounds for a hearing exist).
154. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0585(2)(a) (West 2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-24
(West 2018).
155. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-704(1)(b)(I).
156. Id.
157. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4374(c) (West 2018).
158. Id.
159. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 831-3.2 (West 2018).
160. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.50(1), (4) (McKinney 2018).
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prosecutor.161 This rule applies to both criminal record information
involving convictions and to nonconviction arrest information.162
Similarly, some jurisdictions mandate expungement when prosecutors do
not object. In California, the “concurrence of the prosecuting attorney”
requires the arresting agency to seal arrest records.163 Colorado mandates
expungement of various grades of misdemeanor convictions when the
prosecutor does not object.164 This is a remarkable amount of power: if a
petitioner can convince the prosecutor, or the prosecutor simply fails to
respond, the law requires expungement of a conviction, bypassing any role
for the judiciary that presumably played a role in the original conviction.
That is the rule in several other states as well, whether involving conviction
or nonconviction information.165 By locating significant authority in the
prosecutor’s initial review of the petition without providing any guidance as
to the metric for that review, these statutes essentially eliminate stakeholders
from the process.166
Prosecutorial decision-making relating to expungement petitions has the
capacity to lengthen the process and make it more difficult to obtain relief.
Objections to expungement, warranted or not, often require that the matter be
listed for a hearing, thereby demanding the presence of both parties and an
evidentiary showing.167 In most jurisdictions, courts are required to hold
161. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907.01(B) (2018) (“If the prosecutor does not oppose the
application, the court may grant the application and vacate the conviction without a hearing.”);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1413(b)(2)(B)(i) (West 2018) (“If notice of opposition is not filed,
the court may grant the uniform petition.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(d) (West 2018) (“In
any case where a person has been arrested and an accusatory pleading has been filed, but where
no conviction has occurred, the court may, with the concurrence of the prosecuting attorney,
grant the relief provided in subdivision (b) at the time of the dismissal of the accusatory
pleading.”); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2630/5.2(d)(6)(B) (West 2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-99(a) (West 2018); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-303(d)(2) (West 2018); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:52-11 (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-40-103(8) to -107(7) (West 2017); VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-392.2(F) (West 2018).
162. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907.01(B); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-901413(b)(2)(B)(i); CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(d).
163. CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(a).
164. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-705(1)(d)(II), (e)(II) (West 2018).
165. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-37(n)(2) (West 2018) (noting that for pre-2013
arrests, “if record restriction is approved by the prosecuting attorney, the arresting law
enforcement agency shall restrict the criminal history record information”); 20 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 2630/5.2(d)(6)(B) (providing for automatic expungement if no objection); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 901C.1 (West. 2016) (providing for automatic expungement upon no objection or
initiation by a prosecutor, which is allowed under the statute); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 431.076(3) (West 2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.025(a) (West 2018) (providing for
automatic expungement unless the court finds it contrary to the public interest); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 160.50(1) (McKinney 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7602(a)(3) (West 2018);
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-13-1401(c), 7-13-1501(f), 7-13-1502(f) (West 2018).
166. This arguably amounts to a separation of powers issue that might be worth exploring.
167. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907.01(C) (“If the prosecutor opposes the application,
the court shall hold a hearing on the application.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1413(b)(2)(B)(II)
(“If notice of opposition is filed, the court shall set the matter for a hearing if the record for
which the uniform petition was filed is eligible for sealing under this subchapter unless the
prosecuting attorney consents to allow the court to decide the case solely on the pleadings.”);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-705(1)(d)(II)–(III) (misdemeanor and felony convictions); id.
§ 24-72-705(1)(e)(III) (felony drug possession convictions); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT.
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hearings after prosecutors object to a petition.168 The unintentional costs
should not be discounted in such a situation, especially considering the
presumed deleterious effects of a criminal record.
Prosecutors also wield authority to activate hidden provisions in state
statutes, which broaden or narrow the relief possibilities for petitioners.
Many jurisdictions require petitioners to wait a certain amount of time from
the date of disposition before filing a petition.169 In some jurisdictions, these
waiting periods exist even for nonconviction information.170 But in a state
like Indiana or Minnesota, prosecutors can eliminate or elongate the waiting
period by consenting to expungement or requesting more time for review.171
In Minnesota, expungement following dismissal of charges can be
instantaneous if the prosecutor consents.172 In North Carolina, a prosecutor
can delay expungement by asking for additional time to review a petition.173
Prosecutors also possess other expungement-related responsibilities. Most
jurisdictions require prosecutors to comply with court orders mandating
expungement, which means that offices must have internal processes for
eliminating information.174 Only some states maintain private rights of
action for failing to comply with such orders, so improper dissemination or
use by the agency remains largely unchecked.175 Some jurisdictions assign
notice responsibilities to prosecutors, thus requiring prosecutors to contact
other agencies after an order mandates expungement or sealing.176 Such
provisions require disciplined internal procedures by prosecutors who might
not be inclined to act, thus possibly rendering ineffective expungements
ordered by a court.
In addition to their procedural powers during expungement processes,
prosecutors are not limited in the factors they can consider when advocating
for or against a petition. Most jurisdictions identify factors that courts should
consider when determining the merits of an expungement petition177 but very
few provide guidance to prosecutors as to how they should approach the
substantive merits of a petition.178 Most often, prosecutors can pick and
choose their justifications for opposing expungement without tethering them
to concepts of the prosecutorial role after disposition. To name a few,
2630/5.2(d)(7); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-9-9(c) (West 2018); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
980(D) (2018); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-303(e)(1) (West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 77-40-103(6), 77-40-107(6)(a) (West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-13-1401(c), 7-131501(e), 7-13-1502(e).
168. See supra note 167.
169. See Murray, supra note 5, at 369–73.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-38-9-1(b), -9-2(c), -9-2(e)(4), -9-3(e)(4), -9-4(c), -94(e)(4); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.025(c) (West 2018).
172. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.025(c).
173. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-145.5(c) (West 2018).
174. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122(c) (2018) (detailing prosecutorial responsibilities
postexpungement, which includes retaining certain information).
175. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9183(a) (2018).
176. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-6(a)(4) (West 2018).
177. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 1981).
178. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-37(n)(2) (West 2018).
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prosecutors might be mindful of the progress of the offender’s rehabilitation;
the effect that an expungement might have on that process; the already
existing and potential harm attendant to maintenance of an arrest record; the
need for the information in the future, either for usage by law enforcement or
others; and the value of truth to the criminal justice system and public as a
whole, as well as the individual parties involved in a case. While all of these
considerations are legitimate, the state laws demonstrate that in most states,
prosecutors are left with little to no guidance for thinking through them. This
legislative silence is particularly troubling as it relates to the initial review
phases, where the prosecutor has significant power to affect later
proceedings.
Current regimes also afford prosecutors wide discretion in how they may
choose to use information otherwise ordered sealed or expunged. The default
rule in most jurisdictions is that expungement renders information mostly
private, with only a select few individuals or institutions maintaining the
authority to view the information.179 It is usually the case that prosecutors
are included in that small group, but the parameters of how prosecutors might
use that information, and whether they face penalties for doing so, are
typically a matter of internal policy.180 Without guidance as to how to act
before, during, and after an expungement, or how to prioritize the
considerations mentioned above—legally or ethically—it follows logically
that prosecutorial discretion at this phase can become entirely arbitrary.
Decisions could turn on a variety of factors or a combination thereof,
including who an offender knows, internal office dynamics, the
organizational structure of an office, and prosecutorial workload. This can
result in divergent and inconsistent results, not to mention costly effects for
various stakeholders in expungement processes.
B. Prosecutorial Incentives and Expungement Regimes
The significant leeway given to prosecutors in expungement regimes can
lead to serious, rippling effects, especially if the prosecutor knows the
consequences of a criminal record. These approaches can reflect the
structural, personal, and psychological incentives within prosecutors’ offices,
such as the prioritization of law enforcement objectives, administrative
efficiency, conviction integrity, notions of self-worth, public policy, and
theories of punishment and proportionality.
When it comes to exercising discretion after a prosecution, there are
institutional, professional, and psychological reasons why a prosecutor will
default to protecting a conviction or preserving a record of an arrest even if
the charges did not result in a conviction.181 Put most simply, prosecutors
are judged at a macro and micro level according to their ability to appear
179. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122(c).
180. Id.
181. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the
Unconverted from the Post-Conviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 38 (2009)
(“[I]nstitutional, professional, and psychological incentives are normally aligned with
preserving the integrity of the trial result.”).
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“tough on crime.”182 The efficient achievement of convictions is the fastest
way to project that message.183 On an individual level, a prosecutor’s winloss record might become the measure of his self-worth.184 In the
expungement context, this means that a default position against
expungement—especially for a legitimate conviction—is naturally attractive.
As such, conviction rates—and preserving convictions—contribute to
what others have labeled a “conviction psychology,”185 which the front lines
of investigation, bargaining, and trial cultivate and reinforce. Winning
indicates effectiveness and advances careers. This is why some offices
prioritize the achievement of convictions and their longevity over other
goals.186 When the metric is the efficient disposition of cases with a bias
toward convictions, or at least conviction-like dispositions, prosecutors
default to being advocates against expungement.187 In reality, the
conviction-first mindset probably comes down to the nature of prosecutors’
offices and of the adversarial system, which reinforces prioritization of
prosecutorial advocacy at all costs. Prosecutors’ offices are beholden to their
constituents, including voters and partners in law enforcement.188 Thus,
political pressures and institutional relationships foster prioritizing the
achievement and preservation of convictions.
If convictions are uprooted after the fact, the office risks looking soft and
possibly disloyal to its institutional partners who are also invested in
achieving convictions.189 After all, the majority of prosecutors spend most
of their days interacting with other parties whose aim is to achieve
convictions.190 The result when it comes to expungement is this: although
182. Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, It Is Not Whether You Win or Lose, It Is How You Play
the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 CAL.
W. L. REV. 283, 295 (2001) (“A prosecutor must give the people what they want—someone
who is ‘tough on crime.’” (quoting Patricia Manson, For Defense, Reform Tide Is a Buoyant
Force, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 22, 2000, at 1)).
183. Medwed, supra note 181, at 45 (“[C]hief prosecutors tend to cite their offices’ overall
conviction records to justify their budgets to local politicians and to demonstrate, above all,
that they are ‘tough’ on crime.”).
184. Id.; Ferguson-Gilbert, supra note 182, at 292 (“Many prosecutors measure their
success by the number of wins they tally.”).
185. Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 33, at 472 n.32.
186. Medwed, supra note 181, at 44 (“Some prosecutorial offices unabashedly use
conviction rates as a motivational device—for example, by internally distributing attorneys’
‘batting averages,’ or listing each lawyer by name on a bulletin board with a series of stickers
reflecting the conclusions of their recent cases (green for convictions and red for acquittals).”).
187. Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework,
15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 207 (1987) (citing George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at
Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 118–19 (1975)).
188. Id. at 204–15 (listing the ways that and reasons why a prosecutor might be
overzealous).
189. Ferguson-Gilbert, supra note 182, at 294 (“Prosecutors who do not want to get caught
up in the scorekeeping, conviction-seeking mentality often do anyway because being the
whistle blower is against the prosecutor’s own self-interest in promotions or career
advancement.”).
190. Fisher, supra note 187, at 209 (“[T]he prosecutor, having no individual client,
naturally tends to treat victims and police officers as clients or, at least, as spokespersons for
the ‘public interest.’” (quoting Donald M. McIntyre, Impediments to Effective PoliceProsecutor Relationships, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 201, 219 (1975))).
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the state has offered an avenue for relief, prosecutorial incentives—at least
on the surface—arguably lead to a strong presumption against acquiescing to
the defendant’s petition for relief. Expungement does not naturally fit with
this adversarial mentality. Consenting to expungement amounts to agreeing
to undo hours of work by the prosecutor—hours by which the prosecutor
measures his own worth. To the average prosecutor, unstitching a carefully
achieved conviction—the proverbial “scarlet letter”—requires significant
justification.
Still, prosecutors who sense the policy objectives underlying the statute,
and how they might align with doing justice, might act less reflexively.
Prosecutors might seek to preserve or mitigate the effects of criminal records
or even remain indifferent due to a belief that they are beyond the concern of
the prosecutor. This Part presents different approaches to expungement that
might be adopted by prosecutors in light of their motivations and incentives,
and it identifies their strengths and weaknesses in order to juxtapose them
with understandings of the prosecutor as a minister of justice.
1. Criminal Records Preservation
As noted above, statutory regimes provide prosecutors ample ways to
entrench the existence of criminal records, either in the short or long term
and irrespective of the scope of the substantive remedies afforded by
statute.191 The natural instincts of prosecutors—cultivated by a culture that
values convictions—justify viewing expungement skeptically, even if a
statute suggests a policy in favor of the remedy. For example, although
Indiana’s progressive expungement regime enables prosecutorial consent to
override otherwise applicable waiting periods, there is no guarantee that
prosecutors will do so as a matter of public (or internal-office) policy.192
Rather, incentives and professional expectations might drive prosecutors to
preserve the work of the office by ensuring the continued existence of a
legitimate (in the eyes of the prosecutor) conviction, arrest, or set of
charges.193 Prioritizing the preservation of criminal records likely stems
from the belief that the creation of such records is a desirable end. This
position is probably most in line—and in many instances, validly so—with
the default position of the average prosecutor, who has invested significant
institutional and personal time and effort pursuing a legitimate conviction.194
In the case of pursuing charges after an arrest, the prosecutor recognizes and
validates the efforts of law enforcement.
Prosecutors seeking to preserve records can exercise their discretion
during the expungement phase in two ways. First, they can utilize all
procedural hurdles that are either explicitly or implicitly allowed by the
191. See supra Part II.A.
192. See supra note 138.
193. See NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 8-1.2 (NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N 2009)
(“[T]he prosecutor should defend a legally-obtained conviction and a properly-assessed
punishment.”).
194. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 174 (“[P]rosecutors’ incentives at the postconviction stage
militate against taking action that benefits convicted defendants.”).
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statute. Prosecutors can delay the process of expungement by requesting
additional time to review a petition, nitpicking procedural or minor errors in
pro se petitions, and refusing to consent to otherwise meritorious petitions.
By doing so, they maintain a presumption against expungement, and statutes
that allow for this type of behavior solidify that presumption.
Second, prosecutors might make a point of opposing expungement at
almost every turn out of concern for future law enforcement efforts, broader
values relating to pursuing the truth at all costs, or due to belief that the
offender should suffer the consequences associated with the criminal record.
This approach arguably has support in existing ethical codes, which identify
the primary responsibility of prosecutors as “seek[ing] justice . . . [through
the] presentation of truth.”195 The prosecutor views the continued existence
of criminal records as crucial to safeguarding the public and prioritizing the
“interests of society in a paramount position.”196 The mentality is similar to
a prosecutor who seeks to enforce rather than mitigate collateral
consequences.197 Preserving criminal records is the logical outgrowth of the
metric of winning and the conviction mentality mentioned above.198
This approach has the benefit of guaranteeing a robust defense of the
advocate role of the prosecutor within the criminal justice system. It holds
that criminal convictions, arrests, and any contact by a defendant with the
criminal justice system warrants serious attention that should not be erased
regardless of the unintended, attendant consequences. Entrenching criminal
records sends a message to the public that contacts with the system are real
and serious and that they will not be forgotten short of significant legislative
or executive action above the level of the prosecutor, such as through use of
the pardon power. In this sense, preserving criminal records comports with
the prosecutor’s law enforcement duties. The prosecutor justifies retention
of the scarlet letter in the name of deterrence or limiting recidivism.199
Further, retention allows the prosecutor to enforce collateral consequences
that the prosecutor might think are useful and justified.200 This also connects

195. NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-1.1.
196. Id. § 1-1.2.
197. Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1198, 1222 (2016)
(“In taking the collateral enforcement approach, prosecutors might seek out information about
the defendant’s public benefits or immigration status, and they might leverage the plea
bargaining process to induce defendants to waive protections . . . .”).
198. See supra Part II.A.
199. Interestingly, this justification was behind initial efforts to catalogue criminal record
history information. See Corda, supra note 10, at 9 (discussing how the origin of maintaining
criminal record history information involved concerns about punishing recidivists harshly in
the name of deterrence).
200. Jain, supra note 197, at 1225 (“Prosecutors might view collateral consequences as a
more administratively efficient substitute for serious criminal sanctions. . . . Civil penalties
that attach to low-level offenses, on the other hand, impose no additional administrative
burdens. This approach can also save costs for corrections as a whole. Prosecutors who take
this approach may find that it allows them to take more cases overall and also avoids costs
associated with incarceration.”).
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to a prosecutor’s sense of ensuring proportional punishment, especially if the
prosecutor believes that the direct sanction was too lenient.201
Ensuring the continued existence of criminal records means that the
prosecutor is guarantor of the public record and has a recordkeeping
responsibility that contributes to the legal system’s overall integrity, both in
terms of criminal justice and broader public values, such as those relating to
the free dissemination of information. The latter principles are often the basis
of arguments in litigation involving the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the
accurate reporting of criminal records, including those that have been
expunged.202 Additionally, the prosecutor pursuing preservation is probably
mindful of her relationship with other well-intentioned third parties or
agencies, which might have an interest in knowing about an offender’s past.
As such, the prosecutor views himself as partnering with other entities to
protect the public. This approach responds directly to the institutional
commitments described above, where the prosecutor’s prioritization of
relationships with partners in law enforcement drives behavior toward
defendants.
Of course, responding to expungement this way is not without its costs.
Part I already detailed the range of consequences for individuals with
criminal records. Some of these are legitimate and some are not, but they
exist, and they create a real barrier to full reentry. The immediate
consequences of a denied petition can be catastrophic for the petitioner: some
jurisdictions limit refiling until after a lengthy waiting period, which can
range from one to five years.203 Perhaps more importantly, a denied petition
likely means continued incapacitation due to a criminal record and might
violate principles of proportionality in punishment.204 Restoration then is
delayed because the retribution inherent to the criminal record never ceases,
which inhibits new contributions by the ex-offender. This is justified in some
situations, but in others it is not. Yet the prosecutorial incentives driving a
hostile position toward expungement can allow such concerns to go
unnoticed.
A second set of costs relates to procedural justice and alienation from the
law.
Criminal record history information operates to incapacitate
individuals—both in terms of what those individuals can do and accomplish
in the future and in terms of their attitudes toward the system as a whole.205
Entrenching a reputation after payment of a debt arguably extends
201. Id. (“[T]he prosecutor may appropriate the collateral consequence for retributive
reasons.”).
202. See Sharon Dietrich, May Background Screeners Lawfully Report Expunged
Records?, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CTR. (Mar. 18, 2018, 9:08 AM),
http://ccresourcecenter.org/2018/02/06/may-background-screeners-lawfully-reportexpunged-records/ [https://perma.cc/VX5S-HZFY] (discussing judicial treatment of
background-check screeners who report expunged criminal records as a potential violation of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act).
203. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-413(a)(2) (West 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 7605 (West 2018).
204. Corda, supra note 10, at 42–44 (discussing how the stigma associated with criminal
record information relates to retributive principles of proportionality).
205. See supra Part I.A.
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punishment beyond the crime and without the assent of the community. This
fosters a sense of illegitimacy in the law; the idea being that the law never
lets go regardless of what the offender does to repair harm that resulted from
her crime. If the community desires a more liberal attitude toward
expungement, this approach suffers from agency-cost problems due to a
chasm between communal and legislative perspectives and the prosecutorial
pursuit of those objectives, especially as the prosecutor is acting on behalf of
“the people.” As will be explored in further detail below, a prosecutor at this
end of the spectrum arguably fails to appreciate the quasi-judicial nature of
her discretion at this phase.206
This is precisely where progressive expungement regimes might run into
the cold, hard reality that some prosecutors will defend records at all costs,
even when the illegitimacy of the underlying conviction or arrest is not at
issue. This is arguably a third problem created by the preservation
approach—undermining the separation of powers. Expungement regimes, in
theory, involve all branches of government: the legislature sets policy and
the scope of remedies, the judiciary determines the merits of a petition, and
the prosecutor represents the executive branch and the public and enforces
the decision of the judge. When prosecutors operate to entrench records,
especially in situations where expungement would be otherwise automatic or
preferred by statute, they undermine the other branches of government by
disregarding legislative will and subverting the judiciary.
2. Criminal Records Mitigation
Whereas prosecutors seeking to maintain records in almost all situations
approach expungement with a presumption against relief, those who seek to
mitigate the collateral consequences of criminal records tend to emphasize
forgiveness and prioritize mercy over justice in the end phases of criminal
litigation. This approach tends to focus on the situation of the individual
offender rather than the prosecutor’s perception of the interests of society.
These prosecutors tend to consider the effects of criminal records to be
disproportionate to the original reason for the creation of the criminal record.
And the justification for a more open approach stems from a different metric
of success—reducing recidivism.207
Mitigation has the advantage of being in line with modern-day
expungement reforms because it seeks to broaden relief for a range of
individuals. The mitigation approach sees the deleterious effects of a mere
arrest and therefore proposes a presumption in favor of expungement.
Statutes like those in Delaware, Hawaii, and Tennessee, which allow for
prosecutor-initiated expungement, reflect this understanding.208 Statutes that
limit the arbitrary construction of procedural hurdles for petitioners reflect
this as well, as do laws and that require prosecutors to provide legitimate
206. See infra Part III.A.
207. See Denver et al., supra note 4, at 174. This study demonstrates that the erasure of
criminal records can reduce recidivism. Id.
208. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4374(e) (West 2018).
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justifications that go beyond law enforcement priorities when seeking to
retain records.209 Those same statutes often restrict the usage of sealed or
expunged information by state actors in the future.210 In short, the statutes
seek to incentivize and motivate prosecutors to act in ways that go beyond
the mere pursuit of convictions. This approach undeniably focuses on the
effect that the criminal record has on the defendant after completion of the
direct punishment. Ongoing harm to the individual is presumed, and
expungement can account for that reality, even at the expense of the original
investment by law enforcement in the arrest or conviction.
Prosecutors who seek to mitigate the effect of criminal records prioritize
the fact that a debt has been paid by the offender (in the case of a conviction)
or that an error has been made (in the case of nonconviction charges, for
whatever reason) over the principle that a contact with the system occurring
at a historical moment in time should be preserved. These prosecutors reject
the idea that the primary responsibilities of a prosecutor are to act as a
guarantor of truth and advocate on behalf of the state’s penal interests at all
phases of a prosecution. While truth might be crucial at the guilt and
innocence phase, once the conviction has been obtained, the punishment been
satisfied, and the offender rehabilitated, the existence of the record loses
some of its justification. The prosecutor appreciates attendant circumstances
that surround contacts with the system and views it as his job to control for
some of them if doing so will enable full restoration. In practice, this means
that prosecutors avoid delaying expungement by rarely objecting for
frivolous procedural or substantive reasons, are willing to present a unified
front to the judicial authority, and may even advocate for expungement.
Regimes that allow for automatic expungement upon consent of the
prosecutor implicitly seek to incentivize prosecutors to act as partners in
rehabilitation, moving beyond the process-centric mentality of “plead ’em
and forget.”211
This approach, however, is not without its costs; it arguably eliminates
stakeholders crucial to a well-functioning, legitimate postconviction remedy
system. First, well-meaning prosecutors might not act in accordance with the
wishes of interested parties in particular situations, such as adequately
accounting for the interests of victims who suffered as the result of a crime.
Second, prosecutors who respond favorably to expungement also might
underappreciate the inherent retributive component to a scarred reputation.
It is not always the case that a scarred reputation is the same as a shattered
one. Some letters should remain stitched. There are some instances where
209. See Commonwealth v. Wexler, 431 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 1981).
210. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122(c) (2018).
211. In fairness, the origin of this phrase is “meet ’em, and plead ’em,” which usually
appears in critiques of overburdened public defense programs. See CeCilia Valentine, Meet
’Em and Plead ’Em: Is This the Best Practice?, CHAMPION, June 2013, at 18,
https://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=28953 [https://perma.cc/2KL9-YVXX].
The
author’s conversations with local county prosecutors suggest that understanding the mechanics
of the administration of justice after prosecution in a phase like expungement, and the negative
effects of criminal records, is rarely an office priority, a hypothesis he is currently in the
process of testing empirically.
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keeping a criminal record public and accessible is wise. Third, this approach
might divide prosecutors’ offices internally by pitting the prosecutor who
favors expungement against the institutional and personal investment of the
prosecutor responsible for the otherwise legitimate conviction, or, in the case
of nonconviction charges, the police. Competing incentives can breed
conflicts that can fester and undermine law enforcement efforts in other
contexts.
Mitigating the existence of criminal records or their effects also might not
give enough deference to the information-exchange values of a free society.
One of the major arguments against expungement is that it essentially
perpetrates a lie on society by whitewashing the past.212 Free societies should
not hide their pasts, even when they are not necessarily pleasant.213 And
individuals who facilitate the sharing of accurate information about the
criminal activities of others, according to this line of thinking, should be
lauded rather than reprimanded.214 Political goals incentivize prosecutors to
be mindful of this when considering expungement.
That said, focusing on mitigation enables prosecutors to foster forgiveness
and offer mercy when very few other institutions and actors within the system
are doing so.215 They can help to alleviate basic inequities within the system
that breed pent-up frustration among ex-offenders and other actors. There
are reasons to prioritize individualized legitimacy, including the
postprosecution rights of the accused, over the presumed “tough on crime”
interests of society. Doing so implicitly keeps the onus on the state after
prosecution, which is not the norm, but could help to build trust between
prosecutors and communities. It therefore accords with procedural justice
concerns and seems to be consistent with the values underlying public
policies in favor of expungement and other reentry projects.
3. Criminal Records Indifference
Another possible approach involves prosecutorial inaction or, at most,
half-hearted prosecutorial advocacy. The motivation here is a belief that
prosecutors are not agents of social change; they have a limited role that
already demands significant resources—contributing to determinations of
guilt and innocence. Thus, prosecutors are justified in their indifference to
the effect of criminal record history information because their focus should
be on the primary aspect of their jobs—proving guilt by the end of trial (or
negotiation). Prosecutors focused exclusively on the law enforcement work
of the office do not fully appreciate the effect of a criminal record after the
direct punishment is complete. But they also do not appreciate the depth of
their involvement postprosecution, which makes their engagement in
212. Clay Calvert & Jerry Bruno, When Cleansing Criminal History Clashes with the First
Amendment and Online Journalism: Are Expungement Statutes Irrelevant in the Digital Age?,
19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 123, 131–33 (2010).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Prosecutors already have incentives to do this when it will lead to the future
cooperation of law enforcement.
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expungement hearings an afterthought. In practice, this means prosecutors
defer to the wisdom of the judge and almost always engage in actions that
bring expungement matters to the hearing stage, essentially punting to the
judicial authority.
Agnostic prosecutors tend to see both sides of the expungement debate but
refrain from trying to preserve or mitigate the effect of criminal records.
Instead, these offices adopt an ad hoc, unprepared approach to advocacy,
which suggests a lack of policy commitment or resource constraints. There
is no predicting how the prosecutor might approach an expungement petition
in this model, which of course can lead to selective and differential treatment
for similarly situated individuals. It also can undermine law enforcement
objectives, fail to appreciate the procedural justice concerns of a community,
and counteract the objectives of policymakers in other arenas.
At face value, this approach has several disadvantages. First, it adopts a
callous attitude toward expungement remedies by automatically denying the
significance of a criminal record. This manifests itself in the lack of internal
office policy or preparation for expungement. Petitions may fall through the
cracks and requests for consent by petitioners may fall on deaf ears or receive
the polite response, “let’s see what the judge says.” That leads to a second
problem: prosecutors refusing to perform part of their jobs by not
contributing to the reform and redress of inequities within the system. Third,
prosecutors who are agnostic about the effect of a criminal record will likely
not appreciate the gravity of their decisions in other contexts, such as the
screening, charging, and charge-bargaining phases.
This model
underappreciates the active, discretionary component inherent to the
“minister of justice” label and instead has prosecutors resemble clerical
actors.
One might argue that an advantage of this model is that unbiased judges
make decisions about expungement, thereby solidifying the judiciary as the
final decision maker. An unbiased determination is surely a noble goal.
However, the nature of that determination is skewed by the lack of interest
on the part of the prosecutor. The prosecutor who does not actively seek to
appreciate the reasons for and against expungement does not provide counsel
to the judge making a particularized determination in an individual case. She
also might shirk her legislatively assigned duties under the statute. Thus, the
indifference model also has the potential to cause prosecutors to forget the
importance of representing the interests of various stakeholders.
Before proceeding to discuss how these models, and the existing statutes,
relate to prevailing norms regarding the prosecutorial mindset and behavior,
a few clarifications might be in order. First, the discussion of the above
approaches is by no means intended to close debate about the panoply of
considerations that might drive a prosecutor’s response to the notion of
expungement. Instead, it aims to identify the general frameworks that guide
prosecutorial decision-making in this arena, with mentions of incentives and
motivations that comport with the objectives underlying those frameworks.
These frameworks exist along a spectrum, so it is possible for hybrid
approaches to exist. Prosecutorial incentives are messy and expungement
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regimes can help solidify some and not others, which results in mixed
approaches in practice.
Additionally, this Article does not make any claim about the prevalence of
any of these approaches, or the range of considerations that might permeate
them. That is an empirical project for another day. Still, deciphering the
boundaries between these approaches and how expungement regimes foster
them is analytically useful because it allows for evaluating prosecutorial
action in the expungement phase against the backdrop of existing notions of
prosecutorial responsibility. Juxtaposing these approaches exposes how the
current framework conceptualizing the prosecutor as “minister of justice”—
focused almost entirely on adjudication and determinations of
blameworthiness—fails to adequately account for the complexities endemic
to prosecutorial activity after the disposition.
Determining those
shortcomings and proposing a response is the task of the next Part.
C. The Shortcomings of Existing Guidance
Existing guidelines for prosecutorial discretion fall woefully short for
phases after prosecution other than conviction-integrity review. These
shortcomings are largely the product of history, conservative approaches to
the rules of professional responsibility, and ad hoc rulemaking by judicial
authorities. However, while those guidelines are insufficient, they also
express certain normative commitments that are useful in constructing a
theoretical framework for discretion in expungement.
Prosecutors are often labeled “ministers of justice,”216 a phrase designed
to encapsulate the double role assigned to prosecutors. They are tasked with
advocating within an adversarial system while simultaneously acting in the
public interest. The pursuit of justice as the primary mission dates back over
150 years.217 Early courts described prosecutors as representatives of “the
people” who advocate on behalf of the public interest.218 The U.S. Supreme
Court solidified that understanding in Berger v. United States,219 which noted
that the prosecutor is “the representative . . . of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern
at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”220 Notably, the Court’s
conception of the prosecutor as an impartial “minister of justice” who pursues
convictions fairly does not consider the responsibilities of a prosecutor after
prosecution.

216. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N, Discussion Draft
1983).
217. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 94 (5th ed. 1907) (“The
office of the Attorney-General is a public trust, which involves in the discharge of it, the
exertion of an almost boundless discretion, by an officer who stands as impartial as a judge.”).
218. See, e.g., Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 404, 416 (1872) (“The prosecuting officer
represents the public interest.”).
219. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
220. Id. at 88.
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Professional responsibility norms and rules have evolved over the past
century to call for more oversight of prosecutorial behavior. The American
Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rule 3.8 represents the latest iteration. The
provisions of the rule address five different areas, including conduct relating
to the exercise of procedural rights by the accused, disclosure obligations, the
investigative authority of prosecutors, and public communications and
statements.221 The comments to Model Rule 3.8 label prosecutors “ministers
of justice” with responsibilities extending beyond those “of an advocate.”222
Other guidelines for prosecutorial behavior exist in the ABA’s criminal
justice standards and the National District Attorneys Association’s (NDAA)
National Prosecution Standards. The ABA reiterates how “[t]he duty of the
prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict,”223 and both guidelines
go one step further than Model Rule 3.8 by labeling the prosecutor “an
administrator of justice, an advocate, and an officer of the court.”224 The
NDAA guidelines remark that the “primary responsibility of prosecution is
to see that justice is accomplished.”225 The case law across jurisdictions has
tended to support the “minister of justice” approach but in specific contexts
and without elaboration on application to other prosecutorial activities.226
The ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, association standards, and
scattered cases combine to create a patchwork of guidelines that leave
significant questions as to the discretion of individual prosecutors.
In short, there is a chasm between theory and practice when it comes to
regulating prosecutorial discretion.227 The rules are vague to begin with, and
they fail to recognize the prosecutorial incentives that result from a
221. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8; Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as
Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1587 (“Model Rule 3.8 is now comprised of a half dozen
disciplinary provisions addressing five areas of prosecutorial conduct: the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion; prosecutorial conduct affecting the waiver or exercise of procedural
rights by the accused; the prosecutor’s disclosure obligations; the prosecutor’s exercise of
investigative authority; and public communications by the prosecution team.”).
222. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1.
223. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
Standard 3-1.2(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993).
224. Id. Standard 3-1.2(b).
225. NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1.1 (NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N 2009).
226. See, e.g., In re Peasley, 90 P.3d 764, 772 (Ariz. 2004) (observing that a prosecutor’s
interest “is not that [he] shall win a case, but that justice shall be done”); State v. Pabst, 996
P.2d 321, 328 (Kan. 2000) (“A prosecutor is a servant of the law and a representative of the
people . . . . We are unable to locate an excuse for a prosecutor’s failure to understand the
remarkable responsibility he or she undertakes when rising in a courtroom to announce an
appearance for the State of Kansas.”); Hosford v. State, 525 So. 2d 789, 792 (Miss. 1988) (“A
fearless and earnest prosecuting attorney . . . is a bulwark to the peace, safety and happiness
of the people. . . . [I]t is the duty of the prosecuting attorney, who represents all the people
and has no responsibility except fairly to discharge his duty, to hold himself under proper
restraint and avoid violent partisanship, partiality, and misconduct which may tend to deprive
the defendant of the fair trial to which he is entitled.”). Judicial decisions have led to rules
about the disclosure of exculpatory evidence, among other areas. See, e.g., Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 55 (1988) (noting the constitutionally guaranteed right to access
exculpatory evidence).
227. Medwed, supra note 181, at 36 (noting the “troubling disconnect between the
‘minister of justice’ ideal of the American prosecutor and the on-the-streets reality of
prosecutorial behavior”).
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prosecutor’s bifurcated role. Additionally, the bases for the rules themselves
do not give adequate weight to the significant discretion afforded to
prosecutors in lesser-known phases of a prosecution. As one commentator
puts it, “When the ABA advises prosecutors to act as ‘ministers of justice’ or
‘administrators of justice,’ it is using juris-babble that is practically
meaningless to prosecutors and to the ABA itself.”228
The command to do justice is too vacuous and does not appreciate the
complicated nature of the prosecutorial role, which is contingent on the
setting in which the prosecutor is acting.229 Does “justice” mean procedural
or substantive justice? Do those phrases have different meanings in different
settings? Does the force of the obligation on the prosecutor depend on the
viability and acceptability of other aspects of the criminal justice process?
Does justice equal fairness? Is pursuing fairness an affirmative duty in all
settings or only during the trial phase? In short, “doing justice” can lead a
prosecutor in many directions before returning the prosecutor to where she
started—her own judgment.230
The existing guidelines leave significant room for interpretation in the
hands of prosecutors.231 This leaves difficult questions, many not even
contemplated by the terms of the rules or comments, unanswered.232 As
mentioned above, these guidelines fail to consider the full range of
responsibilities possessed by prosecutors.233 For purposes of this Article, it
is worth pointing out how most, if not all, of the rules are designed to apply
in situations when the prosecutor is clearly operating as an advocate and in
venues designed to determine the defendant’s guilt.234 As a result, precise

228. Kenneth Bresler, Pretty Phrases: The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice and
Administrator of Justice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1301, 1301 (1996).
229. R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us
About a Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to ‘Seek Justice,’ 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 637 (2006)
(“‘Justice’ is an example of a highly generalized axiom of behavior—it does not set forth
permissible and impermissible conduct, and it does not set out criteria for how prosecutors are
supposed to determine what is just.”); Medwed, supra note 181, at 42 (“Even so, the reliance
on ‘justice’ as a governing principle of prosecutorial behavior is problematic because of the
term’s inherent vagueness.”).
230. Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 608 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
607, 622 (1999) (“Discussions of questions such as these are not well informed by the phrase
‘seek justice,’ because of its vagueness. Standing alone, the injunction points in many
directions. It might be taken to imply a posture of detachment characteristic of that assumed
by judges, and quite apart from that ordinarily assumed by advocates, particularly in the trial
context. It might imply an obligation of fairness in a procedural sense. Or, it might imply a
substantive obligation of fairness—for example, an affirmative duty to ensure that innocent
people are not convicted.”).
231. See Medwed, supra note 181, at 45.
232. See Green, supra note 230, at 616 (“The disciplinary rules, however, do not fully
consider how prosecutors’ duty to seek justice may translate into different or more demanding
professional obligations: Indeed, the rules barely scratch the surface.”).
233. See id.
234. Green, supra note 221, at 1575 (“For example, specific disciplinary rules apply to
lawyers in advocacy, but they generally do not recognize different responsibilities depending
on whether the lawyer is advocating on behalf of a class, a corporation, or an individual, or
before a court, administrative agency, or arbitrator.”).
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guidance does not exist for situations not involving the guilt or innocence of
the defendant.
While academic literature has recognized the ambiguity in the
constitutional and professional guidance, proposals in this realm have
focused largely on guiding prosecutorial discretion before disposition.
Scholars have sought to illuminate and justify the factors behind legitimate
charging and bargaining,235 and they have justified prosecutorial regulation
in the trial context when adversarial safeguards are no longer present.236
Additionally, scholars have focused on articulating the line between the
investigative and adjudicative aspects of the position to mitigate bias in the
adjudicative responsibilities of the job.237 That examination led to Professor
Barkow’s proposal, for example, to call for a check on the adjudicatory
decision-making of prosecutors through institutional design.238
In particular, Professor Barkow’s proposals for institutional design focus
on determining which tasks are investigative and which are adjudicative.239
Investigative tasks are those that precede the initiation of charges, although
they retain an adjudicative component given the effect of charges.240
Adjudicative tasks “capture those decisions that effectively amount to a
decision on the merits about a defendant’s guilt and what punishment he or
she deserves.”241 However, expungement relates to both sides of the line,
depending on the type of criminal record history information at issue.
Expungement implicates the investigative side because law enforcement
might find a use for the information in the future. But it also implicates the
adjudicative side because while the guilt and innocence phase has passed, the
merits of mitigating the arguably punitive effect of a criminal record remain
an issue. The prosecutor must ask whether the continued existence of a
record, as punishment, is justified. While informative, the structural proposal
that provides a clean break between the investigative and adjudicative sides
does not neatly answer that question. Further, it is not entirely clear that it is
viable in state prosecutors’ offices—often divided politically by county—and
without the resources of a large, federal bureaucracy.242 Decentralization
makes clarity even more difficult and the need for it that much greater.243

235. See Wright & Miller, supra note 31, at 58–81. See generally Donald G. Gifford,
Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U.
ILL. L. REV. 37.
236. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 176.
237. Barkow, supra note 31, at 887–88.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 888.
240. Id. at 899 (“Treating the charging decision functionally, it becomes clear that it should
be treated as adjudicative for purposes of separating functions in the office.”).
241. Id. at 898.
242. Fish, supra note 34, at 279 (“In particular, prosecutorial self-regulation is more
successful when a prosecution agency separates out the adjudicative function of enforcing
defendants’ rights from the line prosecutor function of obtaining convictions. This internal
division of powers is easier to implement in a large, professionalized bureaucracy (such as the
DOJ) than in a small, locally elected body (such as a state district attorney’s office).”).
243. Id. at 281 (“[T]here is thus reason to believe that the structure of state prosecutors’
offices makes it more difficult for prosecutorial constitutionalism to flourish there.
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III. TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR THE PROSECUTORIAL ROLE
DURING EXPUNGEMENT
After discussing the unique challenges posed by regulating the
expungement process and the failure of existing academic literature to
address it, this Part endeavors to propose a resolution. Part III.A begins with
a discussion of the various justifications for improving regulation of the
prosecutorial role in expungement proceedings. Part III.B draws on these
justifications and understandings of prosecutorial incentives to offer concrete
proposals for reform.
A. “Ministers of Justice” After Prosecution
Although existing guidelines are imperfect, scholars typically justify any
call for prosecutorial justice by pointing to either the immense power
afforded prosecutors or the uniqueness of their role.244 These justifications
offer useful parameters for considering the nature of prosecutorial
responsibility in the expungement context because the aforementioned
statutory regimes leave room for prosecutors to act as advocates and quasijudicially.245 Understanding the justification for pursuing justice is helpful
for constructing a framework in the expungement context, where discretion
must account less for individual blameworthiness and more for a balancing
of broad, diffuse state objectives with the merits of the individual petition.
The “minister of justice” ideal rests on the following premises:
(1) prosecutors engage in atypical legal work when they employ the power
of law enforcement institutions; (2) prosecutors have different legal
obligations than other attorneys; and (3) the historical basis for the
prosecutorial office is unique.246 Building from these premises, there are two
justifications for asking prosecutors to pursue justice: the power afforded
prosecutors and their role as the sovereign’s representative. The first
justification emphasizes how the prosecutor, as a powerful agent of the state,
faces generally powerless defendants in an adversarial setting. The authority
possessed by prosecutors and resource advantages require prosecutors to be
mindful of goals other than achieving convictions. This mindfulness should

Nonetheless, there are a number of state district attorneys’ offices that serve as models of
prosecutorial constitutionalism.”).
244. Green, supra note 221, at 1576.
245. See supra Parts II.A–B.
246. Green, supra note 221, at 1577 (“In the case of a criminal prosecution, in contrast, the
prosecutor is not only a lawyer for the government but also a government official who makes
the decisions on behalf of the government that would ordinarily be made by the client. Further,
the prosecutor makes these and other decisions in light of various government objectives that
derive from the law and legal traditions and that differ from the ordinary objectives of private
clients. The government’s objectives might include not only convicting and punishing
individuals who commit crimes, but also assuring fair and proportional punishment of the
guilty, protecting the innocent from punishment, assuring fair treatment of those affected by
the criminal process, and assuring compliance with constitutional and other legal provisions
regulating criminal investigations and prosecutions. The prosecutor’s distinctive role, that is
captured by the characterization of the prosecutor as a ‘minister of justice,’ leads to distinctive
professional expectations, which are summed up by the duty to ‘seek justice.’”).
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check the temptations that power might foster if left to its own devices. This
justification underlies theories of prosecutorial ethics during phases
involving the guilt or innocence of a defendant, especially at trial.247
The second justification stems from the prosecutor’s role as the
sovereign’s representative.248 Under this form of analysis, the prosecutor
represents a sovereign who delegates authority to make decisions normally
entrusted to the client. This means, in practice, that the prosecutor is tasked
with deciphering the state’s (client’s) objectives and pursuing them. Hence,
the prosecutor functions quasi-judicially by serving as both lawyer and
government representative:
In many situations, a question of prosecutorial ethics will relate not to the
prosecutor’s duties as the government’s trial lawyer, but to the prosecutor’s
fiduciary duties as the government’s decisionmaking representative. In this
role, as would be true of any individual acting as a fiduciary on behalf of a
client, the prosecutor must make decisions and otherwise act in accordance
with the client’s interests and objectives.249

In the criminal law context, the aims of the sovereign state are threefold:
(1) convicting guilty persons and avoiding prosecution of the innocent;
(2) treating individuals with proportionality; and (3) treating lawbreakers
equally.250 The last two implicate expungement.
Both justifications can inform the construction of a theoretical framework
for the exercise of discretion in the expungement context, although neither is
adequate given the variation in prosecutorial involvement at the state level.
The first justification corresponds to the power that prosecutors possess
procedurally and substantively in the expungement context. In several
jurisdictions, prosecutors have the ability to grant or deny expungement
petitions in their entirety or to determine whether the process will be delayed,
requires judicial intervention, or needs to be repeated at a later date.251 That
power, left to prosecutors without check, can be abused intentionally or due
to lack of appreciation for the stigma associated with criminal records.252 As
such, some modicum of regulation is necessary to ensure that prosecutors use
the power wisely; otherwise the imbalance of power that exists from charging
to sentencing is exacerbated after prosecution, given the deleterious effect of
a criminal record. However, the power justification alone does not capture
the prosecutorial function during expungement because prosecutors are not
asked to simply ensure fair procedure. Rather, expungement regimes tend to
247. See Green, supra note 230, at 629; Zacharias, supra note 31, at 50–56.
248. Green, supra note 230, at 633 (“A lawyer serving in the role as criminal prosecutor is
distinguished by the identity of the client, the amount of authority delegated to the lawyer to
act on behalf of the client and the nature of the client’s interests and ends in the criminal
context.”).
249. Id. at 634.
250. Id.
251. See supra Part II.A.
252. Eric Fish makes a similar argument with respect to constitutional rights controlled by
prosecutors. See Fish, supra note 34, at 299 (“Prosecutors should protect defendants’
constitutional rights in those stages of the criminal justice process that prosecutors unilaterally
control . . . [and] adopt judge-role ethics.”).
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provide prosecutors with a responsibility to articulate the position of the state
and, in some instances, actually enforce it.
Thus, the idea of the prosecutor as the sovereign’s representative can
inform behavior in the expungement context. First, the expungement context
is not as adversarial as the trial phase. Second, determining the defendant’s
blameworthiness is no longer the fundamental objective of the process;
rather, the defendant’s eligibility and rehabilitation are fundamental to the
determination. Third, the defendant’s interests must be balanced against the
range of concerns articulated in the preservation model outlined above, which
means that the prosecutor is expected to account for an array of state interests.
And some align with the objectives of the defendant and some do not. For
example, will allowing for expungement send the wrong message to the
public and other law enforcement actors, assuming the prosecutor can
decipher the state’s overall objectives and how they should be applied in
particular cases? Alternatively, how does a prosecutor respond to the fact
that background-check clearance can reduce recidivism?253 Finally, the
statute driving the proceeding is not a prohibition; rather, it is a cause of
action providing relief. The very existence of an expungement regime
suggests a conception of justice that leaves room for mercy. All of these
considerations amplify the nature of the quasi-judicial role during
expungement proceedings.
Because expungement proceedings are not as intrinsically adversarial as
other phases, nor as focused on determining culpability, the prosecutor more
often than not functions quasi-judicially. When evaluating an expungement
petition, the prosecutor is essentially acting as a court of first review.
Evaluation of what to do with the disposition now hinges on eligibility and
the character of the ex-offender (or arrestee) rather than just the
blameworthiness of the defendant, which has already been adjudicated.
Notions of mercy become relevant because the prosecutor’s obligation to do
justice requires considering whether forgiveness is warranted.
Put simply, the theoretical framework for exercising prosecutorial
discretion in the expungement context must account for the reality that
existing expungement regimes situate prosecutors in a quasi-judicial role. In
this role, a prosecutor’s concerns relate less to individual blameworthiness
and more toward a balancing of broad, diffuse state objectives with the merits
of the individual petition. Those objectives are clearer in some situations
than others but their spirit is undeniable—providing an avenue for relief for
worthy ex-offenders that allows the prosecutor and the state to move beyond
resentment and punishment.254 As such, the quasi-judicial role of
prosecutors during this phase arguably imports mercy into any conception of
pursuing justice.
Existing expungement regimes provide prosecutors with the capacity
essentially to gift warranted relief to worthy ex-offenders. It is important to
distinguish this from full-fledged forgiveness, which involves more work on
253. See generally Denver et al., supra note 4.
254. Bibas, supra note 112, at 331.
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the prosecutor’s end.255 Rather, mercy in the expungement context involves
careful consideration of the effects of expungement on the path of the exoffender. And this is mercy that would essentially act to stop additional
punishment from being exacted by the existence of a criminal record.256
It is not difficult to imagine scenarios where mercy might be warranted.
There are plenty of offenses that were once considered serious that have since
been decriminalized and examples of abuses in policing that have led to arrest
records.257 The rehabilitation of a defendant also can justify mercy. And the
collateral consequences of a conviction or arrest might justify mercy as well.
As such, in the expungement context, a prosecutor might be faced with a
decision about whether pursuing justice actually means taking affirmative
action on behalf of a defendant,258 in conjunction with the objectives of the
state, the spirit underlying the statute, and justice overall. At the same time,
as quasi-judicial actors, prosecutors must remain mindful of the limitations
placed upon both them and petitioners seeking relief. Mercy is not warranted
in every instance because justice demands otherwise.
In sum, “doing justice” in the expungement context first means taking
ownership of the prosecutorial role as quasi-judicial rather than a matter of
strict advocacy. The statutory regimes provide as much, and the nature of
the proceeding reinforces that role. Second, being a quasi judge in this
context means that prosecutors, on a macro level, must decipher the
objectives and policies of the state when it comes to expungement relief. In
fairness, while the existence of expungement relief itself suggests some
objectives, states could be clearer as to the priorities they envision for
prosecutors. But one of those objectives is certainly reducing recidivism,
which clear background checks help to do.259 Third, after determining all of
the objectives, prosecutors must strive to properly balance all of the
competing considerations and do so in a manner that respects proportionality
principles and ensures that similarly situated defendants receive the same
treatment. Additionally, prosecutors need to consider thoroughly whether
expungement is necessary to mitigate unintentional results from a disposition
that were not part of the direct sentence, even if the results could have been
justified at an earlier time in the defendant’s history. Particularized
determinations should be normal in this regard. Finally, prosecutors must
recognize how existing expungement regimes provide the opportunity to
pursue justice mindful of mercy. Recognition of that awesome capacity,

255. Id. at 332 (“Unlike forgiveness, which flows from an internal emotional
transformation, mercy is an external gift to a wrongdoer.”).
256. The default position for prosecutors in all phases relating to guilt and innocence is
“doing justice.” Zacharias, supra note 14, at 173. For expungement proceedings related to
nonconviction charges or involving a defendant who has satisfied all of the elements of his
direct sentence, shouldn’t the default position be justice mindful of mercy?
257. See, e.g., The Spread of Marijuana Legalization, Explained, VOX (Mar. 18, 2018, 9:09
AM),
https://www.vox.com/cards/marijuana-legalization/what-is-marijuanadecriminalization [https://perma.cc/WJP5-SHA6].
258. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 182.
259. See generally Denver et al., supra note 4.
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which for too long has only been understood as part of the pardon power,
demands an appropriate response.
B. Proposals
This Part offers a few concrete suggestions to help prosecutors act in a
fashion that pursues justice on a macro and micro level. It begins with a
discussion of institutional changes within prosecutors’ offices and then
moves on to suggest legislative reforms.
1. The Prosecutorial Mindset and Institutional Design
Exercising discretion in the expungement context involves conflicting
interests. Individual prosecutors may feel as though supporting expungement
undoes significant investment by themselves or their colleagues. They may
also feel the weight of expectations from other stakeholders, including
victims, law enforcement personnel, defendants, and the state itself. The
state can send mixed messages depending on whether the public policy
underlying the expungement regime has been made clear. Finally, individual
prosecutors might find themselves in an office with divergent policy goals
and inattention to the importance of expungement. Thus, the first step to
ensuring the fair exercise of prosecutorial discretion is to recognize these
conflicts and mitigate their ability to paralyze decision-making or lead to a
default position against expungement.260
One way to counter some of these conflicts is to separate the adversarial
and quasi-judicial functions within a prosecutor’s office. In other words,
offices might clearly mandate a prosecutor, when determining the merits of
an expungement petition, to be mindful of her quasi-judicial role.261 For such
a measure to be effective, it must occur at the policy level within the office
and through educational measures that inform prosecutors about both the
effects of a criminal record on reentry and the purposes of expungement
relief. Others have commented on creating detailed protocols in the
postconviction review context,262 and there is no reason why similar internal
procedures, or creation of a differential for prosecutors to think through,
cannot exist with respect to expungement proceedings. This will operate to
mitigate arbitrariness in decision-making.
260. See Zacharias, supra note 14, at 218 (“At the postconviction stage, in contrast,
prosecutors may not recognize the conflicts as readily because the various constituencies
ordinarily are less active, may be unrepresented, and may not even know that an issue exists.
As a procedural matter, this means that the judgment of prosecutors often will be clouded with
their recognizing the possibility of a conflict of interest. This, in turn, may lead them to rely
too much on the presumption of guilt as a means for justifying inaction.”).
261. See H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a
Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1716 (2000). While Eric Fish has proposed
something similar in his article entitled “Prosecutorial Constitutionalism,” his proposal is
confined to the phases of prosecution before disposition. See generally Fish, supra note 34.
262. Zacharias, supra note 14, at 238 (“[P]rosecutors’ offices should highlight
postconviction justice issues in their manuals and administrative guidelines. At a minimum,
internal guidelines can accomplish as much as new code provisions in establishing principles
governing the presumption of guilt and the legitimacy of specific questionable criteria.”).
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Another measure that could help to ensure consistency is the development
of a clear office policy on expungement. Many offices treat expungement
proceedings as items on the miscellaneous docket. But given the complexity
of exercising discretion in this area, prosecutors need to carefully reflect on
how they want line personnel to respond to these petitions. Ad hoc decisionmaking cannot be the norm because it too easily incentivizes a default posture
that is adversarial and forsakes the holistic responsibility at this phase.
In terms of office structure, offices should ensure that the prosecutor
assessing the merits of a petition—both procedurally and substantively—is
not the same prosecutor who prosecuted the case. The temptation to oppose
expungement by default is too great. Prosecutors might have emotional
attachments to their prior work, thereby clouding judgment. Prosecutors also
might fear appearing soft to defendants, judges, victims, and their colleagues.
In practice, this could involve the creation of a separate unit—similar to
charging or diversion-eligibility units—that deals only with postconviction
remedies, or simply expungement. Coupled with a clear office policy,
prosecutors could rotate through the unit to ensure that the preferences of one
prosecutor do not become de facto policy and to expose prosecutors to the
arguments about the effects of a criminal record. This, in turn, would allow
for careful reflection by prosecutors when they return to predisposition work
about the long-term effects of a disposition.
Alternatively, prosecutors might consider hiring special expungement
prosecutors with no prior experience as a prosecutor. This person also could
be a senior prosecutor who no longer is involved in the adjudication of
cases.263 Such a position could recognize from the start the quasi-judicial
nature of the task. The hired prosecutor might be required to consult with a
citizen panel periodically to gauge the community’s sense of when
expungement is worthwhile.
Finally, offices should strive to appreciate that the expungement phase is
no longer primarily about blameworthiness. The culpability of the defendant
has already been adjudicated in almost all situations before a petition for
expungement is filed. In the case of an arrest, prosecutors should not use
expungement proceedings as an opportunity to simply restate probable cause
as the justification for retaining a record. In this sense, prosecutors can
recognize that their primary function—determining blameworthiness—is
over and that the system has produced a disposition, however uncomfortable
the prosecutor is with it. Now it is the defendant’s chance to demonstrate
rehabilitation and the prosecutor’s opportunity to contribute to mercy on the
path to restoration. Alternatively, it is a chance for the prosecutor to take
seriously the expectations of other stakeholders arguing against
263. Of course, the risks of making this individual a senior prosecutor should be apparent:
experience or age is by no means a cure for the conviction mindset mentioned above. In fact,
it could make biased decision-making worse because the senior prosecutor does not want to
be perceived as undoing the work of her colleagues and is invested in the conviction record of
the office. See Barkow, supra note 31, at 904 (“Indeed, it is possible that individuals with a
great deal of experience may be biased precisely because their time in the office has colored
their judgment.”).
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expungement. Part of this mindset involves recognizing that contributing to
restoration is not necessarily undermining retribution. Instead, expungement
has the capacity to ensure proportionality—one of the main objectives of
every prosecutor.
2. Legislative Clarity
Legislatures and policymakers, as well as the ABA—through its rules of
professional responsibility—also can help prosecutors to responsibly act in
this setting. First, legislative reforms aimed at clarifying the prosecutorial
role and standards of review throughout the expungement process should
properly situate prosecutorial decision-making within the overall
expungement setting. Second, the terms of Model Rule 3.8, or at least its
comments, need to consider how discretionary decisions related to reentry
connect to the call for prosecutors to seek justice.
Two legislative reforms would be particularly useful. First, legislatures
need to provide clarity, beyond the language of the statute, regarding the
state’s objectives with respect to expungement. Second, legislatures can
create clearer standards of review during the prosecutorial review phase and
the judicial review phase to account for natural prosecutorial incentives that
might cause prosecutors to view expungement skeptically.
Statutes need to clearly articulate the grounds for prosecutorial opposition
to expungement. Some statutes already provide procedural reasons for
objection.264 Very few reference legitimate grounds for substantive
objections.265 Instead, statutes reference the power to object and its effect
but do not indicate to prosecutors why objection might be justified. While
statutes cannot predict every circumstance or potential reason for opposition
to a petition, they can at least articulate the public policy for doing so. They
could also mandate that prosecutors consult with community panels within
their jurisdictions in order to gauge when the community thinks expungement
is appropriate. This way, prosecutors would not be acting in the dark when
it comes to deciphering and representing the objectives of the state, which is
necessary to properly act quasi-judicially. An expungement statute that does
not provide guidance in this area essentially asks a prosecutor to represent a
silent client.
Expungement regimes also need to clarify the standards of review for
prosecutorial and judicial review of petitions. Procedurally meritorious
expungement petitions—that is, those that involve a disposition that is
definitively eligible for expungement—should be assessed within a paradigm
that contemplates mercy as part of justice. Most expungement statutes
involve an even balancing of interests. But the near-universal negative effect
of a criminal record should tilt the ledger in favor of the ex-offender.266
264. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-37(n)(2) (West 2018).
265. See supra Part II.A.
266. Interestingly, Nevada recently passed legislation allowing for a presumption in favor
of sealing “if all statutory eligibility criteria are satisfied” and permitting judicial grants of
sealing petitions if the prosecutor agrees. See Mayson, supra note 89, at 13. Montana also
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Justifying retention of the record should be a higher burden than justification
for expungement, especially given that most expungement or shielding
statutes allow closed-door retention for selective purposes in the future, such
as law enforcement efforts.267 Standards of review need to reflect the reality
that, in the vast majority of cases, expungement will not disturb the activities
of the state designed to protect individuals.
In addition to modified standards of review, legislatures would be wise to
emphasize that the judiciary or an intermediate, administrative reviewing
body, is, in all situations, the final decision maker when it comes to
expungement.268 This holds for both the procedural and substantive review
of expungement petitions. Too many statutes allow prosecutorial objections
to significantly stall or terminate the expungement process by acting as
gatekeepers, which can chill petitioners. Alternatively, legislatures might
consider enacting expiration dates for criminal records to counteract
unnecessarily hostile prosecutors and judges, or inaction by both parties that
effectively prevents expungement.269
In terms of professional responsibility, Model Rule 3.8, the ABA criminal
justice standards, and the NDAA’s National Prosecution Standards need to
recognize that prosecutorial discretion exists in areas of the criminal justice
system beyond the culpability phase. The shadows are dark in the corners of
the system that are only tangentially related to determinations of guilt and
innocence. Neither Model Rule 3.8 nor its comments consider the range of
decisions that prosecutors make without guidance. This is likely because the
drafters of these rules were focused solely on pursuing convictions at trial or
during plea negotiations. Yet prosecutors make countless decisions relating
to a prosecution after it is complete every day.
A modified Model Rule 3.8 would include a discussion of the various
realms in which prosecutors can act simultaneously to serve the range of
objectives of the state and to mitigate the long-term effect of a criminal
record. Model Rule 3.8(a) currently instructs prosecutors to “refrain from
prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable
Why not consider that opposition to expungement for
cause.”270
nonconviction charges that will not be prosecuted—either for probable cause
reasons or others—violates the spirit of this provision?
Comment one to Model Rule 3.8 also mentions that “[c]ompetent
representation of the sovereignty may require a prosecutor to undertake some
procedural and remedial measures as a matter of obligation.”271 While this
comment comes on the heels of a discussion of conviction review for
innocent persons, the same principle arguably applies in the expungement
seemed to enact a similar presumption unless the petitioner has other convictions. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-18-1101(3) (West 2017).
267. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122(c) (2018).
268. If a state assigned review to an administrative panel by way of either a parole hearing
or pardon boards, the judiciary should still remain as a forum of last resort given the
constitutional interests articulated above.
269. Of course, this style of regulatory solution would need to pass constitutional muster.
270. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N, Discussion Draft 1983).
271. Id. cmt. 1.
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context given the effect of a criminal record. In order to competently
advocate for the state, the prosecutor may need to undo a conviction or arrest
to guarantee the remedy afforded by the state. That is a paradox that is
difficult to comprehend without additional guidance.
Additionally, Model Rule 3.8 could contain language about the unique set
of interests presented after prosecution. It could articulate the range of
considerations surrounding a petition for relief like expungement, including
the needs of the defendant, the expectations of other stakeholders, First
Amendment values, the accessibility of the information, law enforcement
needs, the defendant’s rehabilitation, and the effect of granting an
expungement for the state and the defendant. Bringing additional language
into Model Rule 3.8 may be criticized as overbearing, but the current lack of
guidance breeds an arbitrariness that can truly undermine broader public
policy objectives designed to better the system.
CONCLUSION
When the judicial gavel confirms the disposition of charges, prosecutorial
discretion does not cease. Given the unquestionably negative effect of a
criminal record and the limited remedies afforded an arrestee or ex-offender
postconviction, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion after completion of a
prosecution is at least as significant as the exercise of judgment during other
phases.
For too long, examinations of prosecutorial discretion have focused on
what happens in the shadows of the law for the phases before disposition.
Modern-day analyses of prosecutorial decision-making focus almost entirely
on the mindset of prosecutors during the charging, bargaining, and sentencing
phases. The proposals created for those phases do not fully account for the
complexity of the prosecutorial response to expungement. To be fair, many
of the incentives driving prosecutorial decision-making remain in the
expungement realm. But the power afforded to prosecutors, the uniqueness
of the remedy, the mixed messages sent by states affording the remedy, and
the indirect connection between expungement and the investigative and
adjudicative aspects of the criminal process combine to leave prosecutors in
the dark. Neither the law nor the professional responsibility guidelines
clarify what prosecutors should prioritize in this arena. And in a time when
criminal record history information is widely retained and published, the
decisions of prosecutors are crucial.
Responding to expungement petitions is a responsibility of the everyday
prosecutor across state jurisdictions. And considering the negative effect of
a criminal record, it is most definitely a “special” one. Put simply,
expungement matters, and prosecutors have a significant role to play in its
availability as a remedy for offenders struggling to overcome barriers after
their formal punishment has long ended. Any account of prosecutorial action
in this area must comprehend that expungement implicates a host of interests
not fully present throughout the phases before disposition. This panoply of
concerns must force prosecutors to think beyond their roles as advocates in
order to fully grasp the quasi-judicial nature of the position.

